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SOME PROBLEMS ARISING OUT OF DEPOSITS TO PAY
PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST ON BONDS
Paul P. Lipton*
INCE Lawrencev.Fox 1 contractsstudentshave been puzzledbythe
numerous and varying relations that may arise when A, the debtor,
delivers money to B to pay C, his creditor. Equally puzzling and much
more complicated are the rights and relations of the obligor, trustee
and bondholders with respect to sums deposited with the trustee to pay
principal and interest on bonds.
The insolvency during recent years of many large trust companies
that had been named as trustees in indentures securing corporate bonds,
having on hand at the time of their failure large sums of money which
were to be used in making payments to bond and coupon holders, has
brought to the forefront the very important problem of determining
where the loss occasioned by the insolvency of the trustee must fall.
Until recently, however, it was the insolvency of the corporation or
other depositor that gave rise to difficulty, a controversy generally
arising when a receiver attempted to claim for the benefit of all the
creditors of the depositor the moneys on deposit. Analysis of the rights
of the parties in this situation is essential to a proper understanding of
the rights arising on the insolvency of the trustee and will therefore be
attacked first.

S

I
RIGHTS ON THE INSOLVENCY OF THE DEPOSITOR

The problem presented here is one not difficult of statement. Where
a receiver claims the deposits, the ultimate question is simply, has the
depositor intended to confer irrevocable rights upon the bondholders?
Its determination, however, has been troublesome.
Particular attention must be given to the provisions in the bonds
and trust deed relating to the payment of bonds and coupons, for it is
the intention of the depositor, to be ascertained in the light of all the
facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the deposits, which
will be controlling. Many trust deeds now explicitly require the mortgagor to deposit with the indenture trustee funds to meet maturing
principal and interest installments. In the case of deposits pursuant to
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sucli a provision, the right of the bondholders to the deposits has generally been recognized, and the controversy, if one arises, is between
different classes of bondholders. For this reason cases involving such
deposits will be treated separately. With respect to the so-called voluntary deposits, however, the courts have had considerable difficulty in
determining when the bondholders have acquired irrevocable rights of
which they may not be deprived.

A.

Voluntary Deposits

Even where the trust deed does not require the making of the
deposits, it may be somewhat inexact to classify them as voluntary.
Bonds and coupons are generally made payable at the office of the
indenture trustee or at the "office or agency" of the mortgagor, and
the typical trust indenture will require the mortgagor to maintain an
office or agency in a designated city, usually New York, for the payment of principal and interest on bonds. These provisions at least contemplate the making of deposits.
Controversies on the insolvency of the depositor have invariably
involved deposits to pay interest coupons. This might be expected in
view of the comparatively greater number of deposits for this purpose
than for payment of principal on bonds. But more important, perhaps, is the fact that bondholders are diligent in securing payment of
their bonds, whereas it often happens that coupons are not presented
for payment until considerable time after the making of the deposit has
elapsed, thus increasing the likelihood of the mortgagor's becoming
insolvent in the interim.
·
That it was possible for the depositor to so act as to put a fund
beyond its control out of which interest should be paid and thus give
the bondholders rights in the funds superior to those of the general
creditors of the depositor was indicated in two early New York cases.
In Rogers Locomotive & Machine Works v. Kelley;2 one of the leading cases on the status of funds deposited to pay interest on bonds, the
mortgagors deposited with brokers in New York funds to meet interest
coupons and received a receipt reciting that the money was received
"in trust to apply the same to an equal amount of the coupons .•. the
said money not to be subject to the control of said company otherwise
than for the payment of said coupons." An attachment in favor of certain creditors of the mortgagor was issued, but the brokers disregarded
the attachment and continued to make payments to the coupon holders.
2

88 N. Y. 234 (1882).
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An action was then brought to determine the e:lfect of the levy under
the attachment. The New Yark Court of Appeals, reversing the decision in the lower court, 3 held that the brokers were justified in paying
the coupon holders, as the corporation, having intended to devote the
fund deposited exclusively to the payment of the coupons; had no interest in the deposits subject to attachment. The express declaration in
the receipt was said to evidence an intention to create a trust for the
coupon holders.
In the other case, Coe v. Beckwith,4 a decision of the Supreme Court
of New York in r 860, it was held that funds deposited for the payment
of interest on bonds had passed beyond the control of the depositor even
though there was no agreement or other intimation of the status of the
funds deposited. In this case remittances had been made by' the mortgagor to the trustee under the trust indenture, the mortgagor having
previously indicated by letter that all funds thereafter remitted were
"to be deposited to the credit of George S. Coe, trustee of our first
mortgage bonds, for the purpose of paying the coupons of our bonds
secured thereby." Subsequently a creditor of the mortgagor procured a
warrant of attachment which was served on the trustee, who thereupon
filed a bill for instructions from the court as to his duty with respect to
payments out of the funds so deposited. A demurrer to the complaint
was overruled, the court holding that the depository had title to the
funds as trustee for the bondholders and could maintain the suit and
declaring that the bondholders had obtained irrevocable rights in the
funds deposited.
Subsequent cases, however, have been thought firmly to establish
the doctrine that the simple deposit of money i11i a bank or with the
trustee under the trust indenture with instructions to pay maturing
coupons as they are presented will merely constitute the depository the
agent of the depositor to make the payments, and that the bondholders
will not be entitled to the funds on the insolvency of the depositor.
In Staten Island Cricket & Baseball Club v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co.5 interest was apparently payable at the office of the mortgagor, but the mortgagor made annual remittances to the trustee under
the trust mortgage of the amount of the interest due on the outstanding
bonds, and requested the trustee to make payments to the coupon
holders. For this service the mortgagor paid the trustee a small commission. The trustee, a general banking institution, opened a special
3
19 Hun 399 (N. Y. S. Ct. 1879).
'•31 Barb. 339 (N. Y. S. Ct. 1860).
6
41 App. Div. 321, 58 N. Y. S. 460 (1899).
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account with the mortgagor in respect to these deposits, crediting the
plaintiff with the amount received and debiting it with the amount paid
out to the coupon holders. The correspondence between the parties
merely indicated that funds had been remitted for the payment of
interest due on stated dates, and that the moneys had been received
and credited to the mortgagor's account to pay the coupons under a
given date. This course of dealing continued for about thirteen years.
Apparently, not all of the coupon holders presented their coupons for
payment and it came about that the trustee had in his hands about $500
over and above the amount paid upon the matured coupons. The mortgagor, who was not insolvent, sought to recover this balance, but the
trustee resisted his claim on the ground that irrevocable trusts for the
benefit of the coupon holders had been created. The court held that the
only effect of the deposits was to constitute the trustee the agent of the
mortgagor to distribute the moneys; that it did not constitute the
defendant a trustee or impress the money with a trust for the benefit
of the bondholders; and that hence the balance could be reclaimed
though all the coupon holders had not been paid.
The Rogers case was distinguished on the ground that there was
there an express declaration of trust, whereas in the present case "there
is no declaration of trust by the plaintiff, nor words from which a trust
could be spelled out." 6 It was also pointed out that "nothing appears
tending to show that the method adopted for making payment of interest was intended for any other purpose than mere convenience." 7
The court did indicate in the Staten Island case that "There may
be cases of insolvency and deposit under circumstances as will clearly
show an intent to pass title to the money and secure it to meet the
requirements of a particular purpose." 8 And from statements in the
opinion to the effect that the mortgagor continued to remain liable to
the coupon holders it is apparent that the court was influenced by the
fact that a recovery by the mortgagor, who was not insolvent, would
not prejudice the coupon holders.
·
The right of the receiver of an insolvent mortgagor to reclaim deposits made to pay interest on bonds was first presented in Noyes v.
First-National Bank of New York. 9 The opinion does not state where
the coupons were payable. The mortgagor, a railroad, made payments
for about three years at its office in New York. Thereafter coupon
Ibid., 41 App. Div. at 323 (italics supplied).
lbid., 41 App. Div.at 324.
8 lbid.
9 180 App. Div. 162, 167 N. Y. S. 288 (1917).
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holders were paid on presentation of their coupons at the defendant
bank, payment being made from sums which had been deposited by the
defendant in two special coupon accounts. This practice continued for
about ten years. No deposits had been made in one of the accounts for
eight years, but the account was not closed and the sums deposited were
held to meet coupons which had matured but which had not been presented for payment. The mortgagor then became insolvent and the
receiver demanded that the bank turn over to him the amounts remaining on deposit. The bank resisted this claim on the ground that the
deposits created a trust in favor of the holders of outstanding coupons.
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York thought,
however, that the case was controlled by the Staten Island case, which
was "not to be distinguished so far as the material facts are concerned," 10 and judgment was rendered for the receiver. No other
reasons were advanced in support of the decision. On appeal, the court
of appeals affirmed the decision without opinion.11
While the Noyes case is entitled to more weight than the Staten
Island case inasmuch as a recovery by the receiver would prejudice
the rights of holders of outstanding coupons, it should be noted that
the funds in the Noyes case, as was probably true in the Staten Island
case, had, apparently, been on deposit and unclaimed for a number of
years, and that the coupon holders were not represented in the litigation. In a Pennsylvania case 12 reaching the same result, the opinion
clearly indicated that the fund involved had been on deposit for fourteen years, and the bank's only defense to an action by a receiver of the
insolvent depositor was its claimed duty to hold the funds for the
coupon holders. The reluctance of a court to hold in favor of the
depository in such a case should be readily apparent. Quite often bonds
are lost, destroyed or misplaced, and it is possible that the coupons
may never be presented for payment. Certainly under such circumstances it is reasonable that the funds be distributed among all the
creditors of the mortgagor.
One of the few cases in which it actually appeared that the known
bondholders would be prejudiced by the order of the court turning
deposits over to a receiver is In re Interborough Consolidated Corp. 13
the leading case in the federal courts on the status of funds deposited to
10

Ibid., 180 App. Div. at 166.
Noyes v. First Nat. Bank of N. Y., 224 N. Y. 542, 120 N. E. 870 (1918).
12
Homan v. First Nat. Bank, 316 Pa. 23, 172 A. 647 (1934).
13
(C. C. A. 2d, 1923) 288 F. 334, a.ffg. (D. C. N. Y. 1921) 277 F. 249, cert.
denied 262 U.S. 752, 43 S. Ct. 700 (1923).
11
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pay interest on bonds. The bonds in that case were payable at the
mortgagor's "office or agency in the City of New York." For a number
of years the coupons were paid at the offices of the trustee, a general
banking institution, which had been designated as agent for the payment of interest on bonds. A resolution was then passed directing that
interest should be payable at the offices of the mortgagor in New York.
Thereafter deposits were made semi-annually with the trustee, the
deposits being placed in an account entitled "lnterborough Consolidated
Corporation, Interest on Interborough Metropolitan Company 4.¼ %
Bonds," and on presentation of coupons at the office of the mortgagor,
checks stating on their face that they were to be paid out of a fund entitled as above were given to the coupon holders. Subsequently, proceedings in bankruptcy were taken against the mortgagor, and application was made by certain bondholders for an order directing that the
deposits be held applicable to the payment of interest on their bonds.
The federal district court did make some analysis of the problem
involved before deciding in favor of the receiver,14 but stated that
reference to the Nayes case "would have been sufficient, but for the
amount involved and the desire of the court to find some sound reason,
if such there were, to assist those whose tardy presentation was due to
delay occasioned by war."15 On appeal to the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, the question received thorough consideration, but the decision was affirmed.
In the earlier cases no mention had been made of the doctrine prevailing with respect to deposits to pay declared dividends, namely, that
stockholders are entitled to the funds on the insolvency of the corporation.16 The distinction between deposits to pay interest coupons
14 "It may be, and it will be assumed for the purposes of the argument, that
the corporation could so act as to put a fund beyond its control out of which the interest
should be paid (although, quaere, whether the corporation had such power); but such
disposition must be clearly evidenced by acts or transactions whjch show, in effect,
the creation of a trust fund over which the corporation has relinquished control.
Nowhere can there be found anything, either in correspondence or in vouchers,
which indicates that at any time, if the corporation so desired, it could not have
withdrawn the deposit from the Empire Co. and deposited the funds elsewhere,
or retained them and paid the coupon holders, if it pleased, with currency over its own
counter." Ibid., 277 F. at 255.
15 lbid., 277 F. at 256.
16 See 3 ScoTr, TRUS'IS, § 531.1 (1939), and cases cited; 28 CoL. L. REv. 477
(1928}; II N. C. L. REv. II l (1932). Bogert states: "If the corporation which has
declared the dividend sets apart a fund to pay the dividend, as by opening a dividend
account with a bank, it makes itself trustee of the claim against the bank for the persons entitled to the dividend, and such persons are entitled to the proceeds of the
claim against the bank, even though the corporation may fail before the dividend is
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and deposits to pay declared dividends has been the subject of much
criticism. One writer has declared it to be "without reason." 11 Judge
Learned Hand has declared: 18
"I cannot conceive any legal distinction between a fund deposited in a bank to meet a declared dividend, and called a
'Dividend Account,' and a similar fund deposited to meet coupons
and called a 'Coupon Account.' A declared dividend is universally
regarded as a debt, and a coupon is, of course, no more than a
secured debt. How it can be thought, ceteris paribus, that one account should be a trust fund, and another not, passes the limit of
my discrimination." 19
Some cases have emphasized the fact that a declaration of a dividend
creates a debt and that the setting apart of the money to pay it creates
a trust, but there is no good reason why the creation of a debt plus
the setting apart of the money to pay it should be held to create a trust
while the setting apart of money to pay a debt already in existence does
not.
actually paid." I BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 88-89 (1935). The courts in
granting priority to the stockholders on the insolvency of the corporation usually
speak of the deposits as being held in trust for the stockholders by the bank. This
is perhaps inaccurate, as there will generally be nothing to indicate that the bank
is to keep the money deposited segregated and to use it only to pay dividend claims.
See ScoTr, supra.
17 35 YALE L. J. 634 at 635 (1926). It is stated in 24 VA. L. REV. 579 (1938):
"The attempted distinction between the two types of cases is unconvincing and tenuous
at best, and has been severely criticized by commentators and text writers." See
also Grinnell, "Status of Funds Deposited for Payment of Interest on Bonds,"
19 ILL. L. REv. 429 at 434 (1925): "Granting that these two lines of cases are in
conflict, the decisions in the cases involving interest deposits are convincing; the others
are not."
18 Guidise v. Island Refining Corp., (D. C. N. Y. 1923) 291 F. 922.
19 A law review commentator, however, had little difficulty in rationalizing the
apparently conflicting results. See 28 CoL. L. REv. 4 77 at 48 I ( I 928) : "The apparent
confusion of thought resultant upon the efforts of the bondholders to have the courts
impress a trust upon funds deposited for the payment of interest on bonds by analogizing their situation to that of the stockholder may be traced largely to a focusing of
attention upon this similarity of the mere form of the obligation upon the corporation
immediately preceding the setting aside of funds. Such a narrowing of the perspective
overlooks the fact that the right of the bondholder, unlike that of the stockholder, rests
upon an express promise of the corporation to pay so much interest in consideration of
so much money received. The position of the bondholder appears at all times to be that
of a creditor dealing at arm's length with the corporation rather than that of a coadventurer retaining as a result of his investment an ownership interest in the corporate
property from which, ipso facto, a fiduciary or trust relation to the corporation might
be evolved with respect to specific property set aside to meet his maturing claims."
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In the Interborough case it was contended that in principle no
distinction existed between dividend moneys and interest moneys. The
court, however, dodged this issue by inquiring "whether the courts of
New Yark sustain the proposition • • . that in principle no distinction
exists," and then flatly declared that the "cases clearly show that a
distinction does exist. " 20
In holding that the bondholders were not entitled to the funds on
deposit in preference to the general creditors of the depositor, the
court relied heavily on the Staten Island and Noyes cases, declaring
that they could not be distinguished from the instant case. It does
appear, however, that there was one important respect in which the
cases may be distinguished. In the Staten Island and Noyes cases the
, funds were remitted at once with directions to pay the same to the
coupon holders on presentation of their coupons, and payments were in
fact made directly to the coupon holders by the depository. But in the
Interborough case the mortgagor paid the coupon holders by its own
check issued when the coupons were presented at its office. Without in
any way referring to the Staten Island and Noyes cases, the court did
emphasize this difference in saying:
"The fund here in controversy and deposited in the Empire
Trust was not received by the latter under instructions to distribute
it among specified creditors, or to the coupon holders. It was
received by the Empire Trust to be paid out on account checks to
be drawn by the Interborough and directed to be charged against
the separate account which had been created." 21
And at another place the court declared:
" ... in the instant case the trust company assumed no obligation to
the petitioner as respects the debt herein involved-its only obligation, under its contract with the bankrupt, being to pay such
checks as the bankrupt might draw against the fund and the petitioner had no such checks." 22
There was thus in the Interborough case considerable indication that
the result would have been different if the depository had been directed
to make payments directly to the coupon holders on presentation of
their coupons.
The distinction was apparently much relied upon in Giudise v.
20In re Interborough Consolidated Corp. (C. C. A. 2d, 1923) 288 F. 334 at 341,
discussed supra, at note l 3.
21 lbid., at 346.
22 lbid., at 347.
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Island Refining Corporation 23 which was decided shortly after the
decision in the Interborough case in the same district in which that case
arose. In the Guidise case the coupons were payable at the office of the
trustee, and the mortgagor customarily made deposits to meet maturing coupons with the trustee, a banking institution. The remittances
were credited to accounts entitled "Island Refining Corporation Coupon
Account," and as the coupons were presented the bank paid them out
of this account by cashier's check. On the insolvency of the depositor, a
receiver brought an action to recover a balance in various coupon accounts arising from the failure of some of the holders to present their
coupons. Here again most of the funds had apparently been on
deposit for a considerable period. Judge Learned Hand thought that
"each remittance was sent on with the understanding that the obligor
should not have anything more to do with it, and that the bank should
distribute it to those who were entitled" and that "That ... might well
have been treated as an irrevocable release of control, and so a valid
declaration of trust." 24 The Interborough case, it was suggested, could
be distinguished on the ground that the fund remained subject only to
the obligor's order and that this might be deemed sufficient to rebut
the inference of a trust. But inasmuch as in the Noyes case no trust
arose though the bank paid the coupons out of the fund by its own
checks, and as that case was apparently approved in the Interborough
case, Judge Hand felt obligated to follow these decisions, it being
"more important," he stated, "that the law should be certain than that
ideal justice should be done." 2~
A recent case in the Circuit Court ofl Appeals for the Fourth Cir-

28

(D. C. N. Y. 1923) 291 F. 922.

u Ibid., at 923. A few years later Judge Hand, dissenting in Steel Cities Chemical

Co. v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1925) 7 F. (2d) 280 at 284,
declared: "It seems to me to make no difference whether the mortgagor makes a deposit
on which he draws checks in favor of the bondholders when coupons are presented at
his office or whether he directs the bank to issue cashier's checks where the coupons
are presented to itself. In the first case, each check is a separate order on the depository
to pay the payee, who has previously presented the coupon to the mortgagor; in the
second, the letter remitting the funds is a single order to pay to any one who presents
a coupon. I can see no distinction between. the two, except that in the one case the
whole thing is done at once, while in the other it is done piecemeal•••• It does not
advance matters to say that in the second case the mortgagor has parted with control
over the funds, for that is just the question that we are to decide. In the case at bar,
the mortgagor may be said to have parted with control if one likes, but so he may,
though he reserves the right to draw checks in favor of coupon holders."
211
Guidise v. Island Refining Corp., (D. C. N. Y. 1923) 291 F. 922 at 923.
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cuit, Schloss v. Powell,26 denied the right of a bondholder, after the
insolvency of the depositor, to claim funds which had been deposited
to pay interest on his bond. The coupons were payable at the mortgagor's "office or agency in the city 0£ New York." In the trust deed
the mortgagor covenanted to maintain an agency in New York, arid
there was a further provision that if the mortgagor failed to majntain
such an agency, it would be deemed to be at the office of the trustee.
The mortgagor did not designate any particular agency, but on or
before April I and October I in each year from 1900 until 1930, the
mortgagor deposited funds with the trustee instructing it to place the
funds to the company's credit in its coupon account and "authorizing
and requesting" it to pay the coupons as presented. In 1930 the mortgagor became insolvent and a receiver was appointed. The bank turned
over to the receiver a balance in the coupon account arising from the
fact that many coupons had not been presented for payment. The holder
of three bonds with coupons running back until 19 IO still attached then
sued the receiver for payment out of the funds obtained from the bank.
Recovery was denied, the court holding that "the deposit of money in
a bank by a corporate debtor, with instructions to use it to pay maturing
coupons as they are presented by the bondholders, no more appearing,
is not sufficient to show an irrevocable intention so to apply the fund
and to impress it with a trust." 27
That the courts have at times paid more attention to form and fortuitous use of legal expressions than to substance is illustrated by another recent case, Sinclair Cuba Oil Co. v. Mana-ti Sugar Company. 28
In that case the trust deed contained no provisions for deposits of principal or interest, but in a separate instrument the mortgagor designated
the trustee as the agent of the company for the payment of principal
and interest. In making deposits the practice followed was for the mortgagor to send to the trust company a check for the entire amount of
interest payable on a certain date with a covering letter stating that the
check was "to meet payment of" or represented the "amount required
to pay" the installment of interest presently to become due, and asking
the trust company to receipt and return an enclosed voucher. After this
practice had continued for some time, the trustee in returning the
voucher wrote: "This money is received by us as a trust fund for the
payment of interest as it matures, and we would thank you to confirm
{C. C. A. 4th, 1938) 93 F. (2d) 518, noted 24 VA. L. REv. 579 (1938).
Ibid., 93 F. (2d) at 519.
28 (D. C. N. Y. 1932) 2 F. Supp. 240.
26

27
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our understanding." The company replied confirming this understanding, but from then on the procedure in making deposits was as indicated above.
On the insolvency of the mortgagor the receiver moved to compel
the trustee to turn over the unapplied bond interest moneys, but the
court refused to so do, declaring that "a trust established for one payment would, in the absence of proof to show a subsequent contrary
intention, indicate a trust relation for the later payments." 29
Though the writer has no quarrel with the result in this case, it
seems somewhat artificial that it should depend on this chance communication between the mortgagor and the depository. 80 Probably any
mortgagor would have made a similar reply to such an inquiry and it
hardly seems possible that deposits subsequent to such a communication
were made with any di:fferent intent than if no such communication
had been had. It should be noted, however, that unlike most of the
29

Ibid., at 242.
.
Another illustration of how a court relied on somewhat tenuous grounds to
reach a result in favor of the bondholders is found in the case of Steel Cities Chemical
Co. v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., (C • C. A. 2d, 1925) 7 F. (2d) 280, noted
10 MINN. L. REv. 178 (1925), 35 YALE L. REv. 634 (1926). In that case the
bonds provided that the company would pay principal and interest at its office or
agency in the borough of Manhattan. The trust deed did not contain provisions requiring deposits to pay principal or interest, but did provide that "any moneys at any
time deposited by the company with the trustee for the redemption or other payment
of bonds or for the payment of interest thereon shall be and are hereby assigned,
transferred and set over unto the trustee in trust for the holders of the bonds or coupons
intended to be paid therewith." Subsequently, the mortgagor appointed the trustee as
its agent for the payment of interest on bonds. The usual procedure of the mortgagor
in transmitting funds to the trust company was to inclose a check and voucher receipt
in a letter stating that a check was inclosed with which to pay the coupons due on a
given date "covering six months interest on the 7% first mortgage gold bonds of this
company, as per trust agreement dated June 1st, 1922."
On the insolvency of the depositor, receivers sought an order to show cause why
the balance on deposit with the trustee should not be turned over to them. The court
held, however, that under the provision of the indenture quoted above, the ·deposits
gave rise to a trust in favor of the bondholders, and the receivers' petition was dismissed. While, literally construed, the provision of the trust deed might be held to
cover the deposits, it is more probable, as pointed out by Judge Hand in a dissenting
opinion, that this provision did not cover such deposits, but was intended to apply
only to redemption deposits with respect to which such provisions are often found.
Moreover, it is doubtful that by the appointment of the trustee as paying agent rather
than some one else the mortgagor intended that the effect of the deposits should be any
different. "The ground of distinction, therefore, seems rather tenuous; but the result
is desirable and its achievement on so slight a ground may indicate the beginning of
judicial attrition of the seemingly groundless distinction between deposits to pay dividends declared and deposits to pay interest coupons." 35 YALE L. J. 634 at 635
(1926).
80
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cases that have been discussed above, subst~tially all of the funds
had b_een on deposit less than two years, and the likelihood that the
coupons would yet be presented was not remote but very real.
The picture the above case~ present is far from satisfactory. Most
of them seemingly hold that funds deposited to pay interest on bonds
are held by the depository as agent of the depositor and that the bondholder will not be entitled to a preference in such funds. Closer examination, however, reveals that in many of· these cases the bondholders
were not represented in the litigation, and that the funds involved
were deposits that had been unclaimed for years. There can be little
doubt but that the courts have been reluctant to permit the depository
to retain the funds for the benefit of coupon holders who have unreasonably neglected to present their coupons and who may never do so.
Moreover, there is considerable indication in the decisions that the
courts have been influenced by the fact that the risk of loss of such
deposits would be on the mortgagor and not on the bondholders. 31
The feeling seems to be that it would be inconsistent to allow the
bondholders to claim the money on the insolvency of the depositor
if they would not be chargeable with the loss of the funds on the
insolvency of the depository. There is, however, no inconsistency in
legal theory between these results. It is well-established that a debtor
may, if he so intends, confer rights on his creditor as beneficiary of a
trust, or otherwise, which will be in addition to, and not in discharge
of the personal liability of the debtor, and that the creditor may enforce
either or both of his claims, subject, however, to the limitation that
he will be entitled to no more than one satisfaction of the debt. 32
31 "If it [ the bank] had become insolvent, is there any doubt that the coupon holders could, nevertheless, have recovered from Consolidated?" In re Interborough
Consolidated Corp., (D. C. N. Y. 1921) 277 F. 249 at 256. "It may well be asked
in the instant case: Had the Bank failed after the Railroad made the deposit in question but before the holders presented their coupons and received payment thereof, would
the Railroad or the coupon holders have sustained the loss of said fund resulting from
the Bank's failure? There can hardly be any serious question that such loss would have
fallen on the Railroad." From the unreported opinion of the District Judge [Transcript
of Record, p. 34] in Schloss v. Powell, (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) 93 F. (2d) 518. "If the
bank had failed under the situation here existing, with coupons unpaid, it is clear that
the loss would have fallen on the Lake Superior Corporation, not on the coupon holders."
Homan v. First Nat. Bank, 316 Pa. 23 at 28, 172 A. 647 (1934).
33 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS, § 330.6 (1939). See also Silver v. Park-Lex Holding Corp.,
222 App. Div. 40 at 43, 225 N. Y. S. 394 (1927): "Nor did the fact that the plaintiff
sought to establish his claim in bankruptcy against the estate of Miller & Co. amount
to an acceptance of Miller & Co. as his sole debtor or an election to look only to the
funds in its hands for the satisfaction of his claim. Such act was consistent with his
rights to look also to the principal debtor, and his remedies were consistent and
,::oncurrent."
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Undue emphasis has, it seems, been placed on the presence or absence of technical terms. The net effect of the decisions is that unless
the word "trust" is used in some writing between the parties the bondholders will have no claim to the funds deposited on the insolvency
of the depositor. There is, however, no reason why an intention to
confer irrevocable rights on the bondholders might not be found in
the course of dealing between the depositor and depository or in other
circumstances surrounding the transaction. It is probably true that,
where a debtor on one isolated occasion deposits funds in a bank with
instructions to pay a certain creditor, the proper inference is that the
disposition thus voluntarily made is made for the debtor's own purposes and convenience, 33 and that hence the depository is merely the
agent of the debtor to make the payment to the creditor. But where a
mortgagor has covenanted to maintain an agency for the payment
of coupons, has designated its :fiscal agent and then makes deposits to
the credit of special coupon accounts, upon which no interest is credited,
instructing the depository to pay the coupons on presentation, the proper
inference, it would seem, is that the depositor has parted with all
control over the funds deposited, intending the funds to be appropriated
exclusively and irrevocably to the payment of coupons, and that it has
thus conferred upon the coupon holders rights of which they may not be
deprived. 84
In the cases that have recognized the right of the bondholders to
funds on deposit, the court has declared that a trust for the benefit of
the bondholders has been created. 35 Though there was no clear indication of the precise nature of the trust, what the court probably had in
mind was a trust of the funds. An intention to grant the bondholders
irrevocable rights in the deposits may be manifested by the creation of
an irrevocable trust for their benefit, but in such a case it must clearly
appear that the parties intended that the depository was to keep the
money separate and use it only in the payment of coupons. 86 In none
Cf. 3 ScoTI, TRuSTS, § 330.6 (1939).
"While the principal decision [Schloss v. Powell, (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) 93
F. (2d) 518] seems to be supported by the weight of authority, the result seems
undesirable and offends the lay mind. Moreover, it is doubtful if it reflects the true
intention of the corporate depositor." 24 VA. L. REv. 579 at 580 (1938). See 1'
BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 20 (1935).
85
Steel Cities Chemical Co. v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., (C. C. A. 2d,
1925) 7 F. (2d) 280; Sinclair Cuba Oil Co. v. Manati Sugar Co., (D. C. N. Y. 1932)
2 F. Supp. 240; Rogers Locomotive& Machine Works v. Kelley, 88 N. Y. 234 (1888).
85
3 Sc01T, TRUSTS, § 531.1 (1939). In Lyon County Bank Mortgage Corp.
v. Walker River Irrigation District, 57 Nev. 485, 67 P. (2d) 1010 (1937), where
funds were deposited in a bank for the purpose of paying interest and principal on a
88

84
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of the cases referred to was there any indication that this in fact had
been the understanding of the parties. Where, as in these cases, the
depositor has manifested an intention to surrender all control over
the deposits, it would not be unreasonable to hold that the depositor is
a trustee for the coupon holders of its claim against the depository. 37
It has been suggested that where a corporation deposits money in
a bank for the payment of interest on its bonds neither the corporation
nor the bank becomes trustee for the bondholders, but that the transaction is a contract between the corporation and the bank for the benefit
of the coupon holders.88 The coupon holders would be entitled to a
preference on the insolvency of the depositor only if the depositor
intended the contract to be irrevocable. Where the depository is directed
to make payments directly to the coupon holders, as is generally true,
it might be contended that the depository by accepting the deposits impliedly agrees to make the payments to the coupon holders. The New
York Court of Appeals, however, in reversing a decision permitting
recovery by a coupon holder against the depository declared: "We
find no such agreement to pay contained in the agreed statement of
facts in this case. Directions standing alone to a bank or to an agent
do not constitute an agreement by the bank or the agent for the benefit
of a third party." 89 And in the Staten Island case, where it was contended that the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox 40 applied,. the court
pointed out that "The defendant has entered into no agreement to pay
the bondholders, nor has it made any promise that it would pay
them." 41
In view of the unsatisfactory state of the authorities with respect
bond issue, accompanied by a letter stating that the sum deposited "shall be deemed
and considered as a special trust fund for the aforesaid purpose and not as a deposit
in which the relation of debtor and creditor exists," the court nevertheless refused to
grant the depositor a preference on the insolvency of the bank on the ground that
"there was no understanding that the fund deposited in the bank for a special purpose
was not to be used by the bank for its own purposes." 57 Nev. at 505 .
. 37 1 ScOTT, TRusTS, § 12.12 (1939). See also I BoGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusT1>Es
87 (1935): "It would seem clear that the corporate debtor ought to be held to have
declared itself a trustee of its claim against the depositary on the coupon account,
for the benefit of the coupon holders. The corporation has clearly set apart a portion of
its assets to meet a debt."
88 1 Scon, TRUSTS, § 12.12 (1939).
89 Erb v. Banco Di Napoli, 243 N. Y. 45 at 48-49, 152 N. E. 460 (1926)
(action to recover amount of three lost coupons; neither the depositor nor the bank
was insolvent).
40 20 N. Y. 268 (1859).
41 Staten Island Cricket & Baseball Club v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 41 App.
Div. 321 at 323, 58 N. Y. S. 460 (1899).
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to the right of the coupon holders to funds deposited to pay coupons,
the recently proposed Uniform Trusts Act 42 might offer a satisfactory
statutory solution of the problem. The provisions of that act, which
were designed "to do away with a few obsolete and unjust rules of
trust law which have come about through unfortunate judicial decisions or are survivals of ancient property law," 43 would in effect grant
the bondholder a preference if he presented his claim within one year
after the deposit was made. Section 2 provides as follows:

"I. Whenever a bank account shall, by entries made on the
books of the depositor and the bank at the time of the deposit, be
created exclusively for the purpose of paying dividends, interest
or interest coupons, salaries, wages, or pensions or other benefits
to employees, and the depositor at the time of opening such account
does not expressly otherwise declare, the depositor shall be deemed
a trustee of such account for the creditors to be paid therefrom,
subject to such power of revocation as the depositor may have
reserved by agreement with the bank.
"2. If any beneficiary for whom such trust is created does not
present his claim to the bank for payment within one year after it
is due, the depositor who created such trust may revoke it as to
such creditor."
Under this section the depositor would be deemed to hold its claim
against the bank in trust for the bondholders unless the depositor at the
time the account is opened expressly declares that the deposit is not to
have this effect. As the coupon holder is given one year to "present his
claim to the bank," the section probably applies not only where the
bank makes payments directly to the coupon holders, but where, as in
the lnterborough case, the depositor itself pays the coupon holders by
checks drawn on the account. 44 Revocation of the trust created by the
depositor is permitted if the claim is not presented within one year,
and on the insolvency of the depositor the trustee in bankruptcy or
42 The Uniform Trusts Act was adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1937, and up to the end of 1939 had been
adopted only by Louisiana and North Carolina. The Louisana statute, however, omitted
section 2. See 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED (Supp. 1939), p. 239. The act may also
be found in l BoGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 7 (Supp. 1938). See Vanneman and
Rowley, "The Uniform Trusts Act," 13 UNiv. CIN. L. REV. 157 (1939); Nylund,
"The Uniform Acts Relating to Trusts," 16 CHI-KENT. REv. 81 (1938).
43 See prefatory note to Uniform Trusts Act.
"See Vanneman and Rowley, "The Uniform Trusts Act," 13 UNIV. CIN. L. REV.
157 at 161 (1939).
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receiver could undoubtedly exercise the rights of the insolvent. This
provision was very likely designed to cover the situation where the bank
might otherwise be entitled to retain funds indefinitely for beneficiaries
who may never present their claims.
The above section was drafted, in part at least, with a view toward
abolishing the distinction that now exists between deposits to pay declared dividends and deposits to pay interest on bonds. 45 The provisions of the act were extended to cover accounts to pay wages and
other benefits to employees on the theory that they are governed by
the same considerations, but it should be noted that deposits to pay
principal on bonds have not been covered. Though controversies over
deposits to pay interest have caused the most difficulty, it would seem
that deposits to pay principal should be governed by the same considerations, and the act might well have included them.
Before turning to a discussion of the problems arising when the
deposits are required by the terms of the trust deed, it is interesting to
note that the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 46 provides that an indenture
to be qualified 47 "shall provide that each paying agent shall hold in
trust for the benefit of the indenture security holders or the indenture
trustee all sums held by such paying agent for the payment of the principal of or interest on the indenture securities." 48 Such a provision
would undoubtedly enable the bondholders to claim funds deposited
to pay principal or interest on the insolvency of the depositor.
B.

Deposits Required by the Trust Deed
The deposits provided for in the trust indenture may be of various
sorts. The indenture may simply require the mortgagor to deposit with
the trustee a specified number of days in advance funds sufficient to
45 See prefatory note to Uniform Trusts Act: "1. Bank Account for Special Debts.
Under the common law decisions it has been held that if a debtor sets up a bank
account to pay dividends, he is trustee of that account for the stockholders, but if he
sets up a bank account to pay bondholders' coupons, he is not a trustee for the bondholders. It is generally admitted that this is a distinction without justification and
that all such accounts, including pay roll accounts, should be deemed to be held in
trust for the special class of creditors named. Section 2 of the Uniform Trusts Act so
provides. This does not make the bank a trustee for anybody."
46 53 Stat. L. n49 (1939), 15 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 77aaa et seq.
47 In general, the act applies only to trust indentures required to be filed with the
·
Securities and Exchange Commission as part of a registration statement under the
S~curities Act· of 1933. For a thorough discussion of the purposes and provisions of the
Act, see 25 CoRN. L. Q. 105 ( 1939). For a discussion of the act as originally proposed,
see Banks, "Indenture Securities and the Barkley Bill," 48 YALE L. J. 533 (1939).
48 53 Stat. L. n73, § 317 (z)(b) (1939), 15 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 77qqq
(z)(b).
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meet maturing principal and interest installments.49 In recent years
bond issues with serial maturities have been extensively employed, and
in connection with such issues it has been customary to provide in the
trust deed for periodic deposits with the trustee of a certain percentage
of the principal and interest installments due at the next interest date. so
Where the serial maturity device has not been employed, many trust
deeds, especially in connection with industrial bond issues, require payments to the trustee for sinking fund purposes. While sinking fund
provisions have variegated and divergent characteristics, the most common requirement is that the funds be used to purchase bonds of the
same issue, either by redemption by lot at the call price or by purchase
in the open market. 51
The rights of the bondholders with respect to any such deposits will
depend on the proper construction to be given to the provision in the
trust deed authorizing or requiring the deposit. The terms of the trust
deed may be so specific as to leave no doubt of the right of the bondholders to the funds in the event of the insolvency of the depositor.
With respect to deposits for redemption before final maturity at the
option of the mortgagor or those which are to operate by way of final
defeasance of the mortgaged property, the trust deed usually provides
that the deposit with the trustee is to be deemed a full payment of the
bond or coupon and that the bondholder is to look for the payment of
such bond or coupon only to the sums so deposited.5 2 The right of the
bondholders to such deposits in preference to the general creditors of the
depositor can hardly be denied. And this would be equally clear where
the trust deed stipulates that the funds deposited are to be held in trust
for the bondholders or contains other language indicating an intention
9

Morley v. University of Detroit, 269 Mich. 216, 256 N. W. 861 (1934),
discussed in detail infra beginning at note 97.
so Equitable Trust Co. v. Green Star S.S. Corp., (D. C. N. Y. 1922) 291 F.
650, affd. (C. C. A. 2d, 1924) 297 F. 1008.
51
See DEWING, FINANCIAL Poucy OF CoRPORATIONs, 3d ed., 668 et seq. (1934),
for a classification and discussion of sinking fund provisions. See also 24 VA. L. REV.
293 (1938); McCLELLAND AND FISHER, CoRPORATE MoRTGAGE BoND lssuEs 543
et seq. (1937).
52 The following provision is typical: "Such deposit shall be in full payment of such
bonds and coupons belonging thereto and thereupon and thereafter said bonds and
coupons belonging thereto shall be precluded from participating in the lien and
security offered by these presents and the holder or holders shall look for the payment
of the said bonds and interest accrued to the time fixed for their retirement only
to the sum so deposited in the hands of the said trustee." Silver v. Park-Lex Holding
Corp., 222 App. Div. 40 at 44, 225 N. Y. S. 394 (1927). See Andrews v. Missouri
State Life Ins. Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1932) 61 F. (2d) 452 at 454; Morley v. University of Detroit, 269 Mich. 216 at 219, 236 N. W. 861 (1934).
'
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that the depositor is to have no interest in or control over the deposits. Ga
But even in the absence of any language in the trust deed specifically indicating such an intention, it would seem that the bondholders should be entitled to the funds in the hands of the trustee on
the insolvency of the depositor. The deposits are unquestionably intended for the benefit of the bondholders and the provisions requiring
them should be construed to give the bondholders the maximum
amount of security and protection. 54 Moreover, the right of the bondholder to a preference in respect to such deposits might be sustained
upon the theory that the bondholders acquire an equitable lien on the
funds on the making of the deposits. In the Interborough case,55 where
the court denied the existence of an equitable lien, the opinion emphasized the fact that "the interveners clearly did not contract with the
bankrupt upon the credit of the particular fund in controversy, there
being no agreement either with the bondholders or with the trustee of
the mortgage that this or any other special fund should be set apart
from the general assets to pay interest as it matured." 56 A provision in
the trust deed requiring deposits to pay principal and interest on bonds
does constitute such an agreement.
The right of the bondholders to such deposits in preference to the
general creditors of the depositor has in fact been sustained. The really
troublesome problems with respect to these deposits involve the determination of the specific bondholders entitled to the deposits.
In Equitable Trust Co. v. Green Star S.S. Corporation,5 1 the trust
deed provided that the mortgagor would "pay to the trustee" every two
months, "as and for a sinking fund for the payment of maturing bonds
and interest accruing at the next succeeding interest date, an amount
equivalent to thirty-three and one-third per cent of the principal
amount of the outstanding bonds next maturing hereunder, together
with an amount equivalent to thirty-three and one-third per cent of
the semiannual interest accruing at the next succeeding interest date
on all outstanding bonds."
On December rn, I 920, the mortgagor made a deposit of onethird of the principal due on the next maturing bonds, series C, and
one-third of the interest due at the next interest date, but failed to
In re National Public Service Corp., (D. C. N. Y. 1933) 3 F. Supp. 262.
McCLELLAND AND F1sHER, CoRPORATE MoR'I'GAGE BoND IssuES 556 (1937).
55 In re Interborough Consolidated Corp., (C. C. A. 2d, 1923) 288 F. 134,
discussed supra, note 13.
58 lhid., 288 F. at 350.
.
51 (D. C. N. Y. 1922) 291 F. 650, affd. (C. C. A. 2d, 1924) 297 F. 1008.
58

54
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make the second and third payments. Series C fell due on April 15,
1921, but two days before this maturity date the mortgagor became
in default and under the trust indenture the trustee was empowered
to take possession, accelerate the maturity of all outstanding bonds,
and foreclose. The trust deed further provided that in case of default
and sale of the mortgaged premises "The purchase money, proceeds and
avails of any sale of the trust property, together with any other sums
which then may be held by the trustee under any provisions of this
indenture as part of the trust property or of the proceeds thereof"
should be distributed equally among the bondholders to the extent
necessary to satisfy their claims. No action was taken until after the
due date of Series C, however, but shortly thereafter a receiver was
appointed. In a subsequent proceeding the receiver claimed the funds
on deposit and the trustee claimed the right to apply the money equally
to the payment of all outstanding bonds.
The case was heard by Judge Learned Hand, who had no difficulty
in determining the status of the deposits. "That the sinking fund as a
whole is a trust fund seems to me too plain for discussion," he declared,
merely citing two cases,58 and "Therefore the question is only as to who
are the beneficiaries, whether the whole bondholders or Series C." G9
The court pointed out that the holders of Series C bonds would have
been the beneficiaries of the fund in the normal course of events, that
the fact that the subsequent deposits were not made could not a:ffect
their rights to the sum already deposited, and that as nothing had been
done to divest the rights of the holders of Series C before maturity
date, they were entitled to the funds. But the court went further and
GS Rogers Locomotive & Machine Works v. Kelley, 88 N. Y. 234 (1888), and
Holland Trust Co. v. Sutherland, 177 N. Y. 327, 69 N. E. 647 (1904). The Rogers
case,. which has been discussed supra, note 2, did not involve a sinking fund, but only
a deposit to pay interest on bonds. Because of a recital in the receipt issued by the
depository that the funds were received "in trust," the court held that the depositor
no longer had an interest in the funds which could be reached by attaching creditors.
In the Holland Trust Co. case the trust deed required the mortgagor to transfer
to the trustee certain rentals "to be used exclusively to pay the interest on said bonds
and for no other purpose." A creditor of the mortgagor levied an attachment on funds
in the hands of the trustee. The trustee then brought suit in equity against the attaching creditor asking for instructions as to its duties. All that the court of appeals actually
was called upon to decide was whether or not the trustee could maintain the suit,
and it was held that he could. In the course of the opinion the court said: "The legal
effect of that special deposit not only created the plaintiff trust company a trustee for
the coupon holders, but it changed the title to said moneys from the water company
to the trust company, in whose possession it constituted a trust fund for the benefit
of coupon holders as cestuis que trust." 177 N. Y. at 329-330.
9
G Equitable Trust Co. v. Green Star S. S. Corp., (D. C. N. Y. 1922) 291 F.
650 at 651.
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indicated that even under the terms of the indenture quoted above
nothing could have been done at any time to divest the holders of Series
C of their rights in the funds, as the provision was not intended to cover
funds which had been specifically allocated to a class of bondholders.
The decision awarding the funds to the holders of Series C bonds
is probably correct on the facts of the case, though this might have been
somewhat doubtful if the trustee had in fact exercised his right to take
possession and foreclose before the maturity date of Series C. The
characterization of the sinking fund as a trust fund may not, however,
have been accurate, as there was nothing to indicate that the trustee
was to keep the very funds deposited segregated or was to assume any
obligation other than to pay the bondholders out of its general funds.
This, however, should not affect the right of the bondholders to the
funds on deposit on the insolvency of the depositor, at least where the
trustee is not insolvent as well. To bring the result within a convenient
legal mechanism, if that is necessary, it might be said that the depositor
holds its claim against the trustee in trust for the bondholders.
The Equitable Trust Company case has been followed in subsequent cases.60 In Armada State Bank v. Union Guardian Trust Co.,61
the mortgagor had covenanted to make monthly deposits of an amount
equivalent to one-twelfth of the principal falling due the next succeeding principal payment date, the intention being, the trust deed
recited, that "said sinking funds deposited shall be sufficient to meet
the respective interest, principal and tax requirements in full, when
due." Though bonds amounting to $6,000 matured on August r, r93r,
60 Armada State Bank v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 262 Mich. 487, 247 N. W.
78j1 (1933); Tucker v. Empire Trust Co., 242 App. Div. 380, 274 N. Y. S. 895
(1934). In Tucker v. Empire Trust Co. the mortgage provided for quarterly payments to the trustee of one-fourth of the respective installments of principal next to
become due, the intention being, it was said, that such aggregate payments "shall be
sufficient to meet such principal payments when and as they mature." The installment
of principal due on May I, 1932, amounted to $44,000, but of this amount only
$22,000 had been deposited. On May 23, 1932, foreclosure proceedings were instituted and a judgment of foreclosure and sale was entered. A controversy then arose
as to who was entitled to the sum on deposit with the trustee--the holders of the bond
participation certificates to become due or the holders of all outstanding certificates.
The Appellate Division, of the Supreme Court of New York held that the holders
of the certificates next to become due were entitled to the funds, the reasoning in the•
Equitable Trust Co. case being persuasive and quite applicable. The court stated that had
the full sum been deposited before foreclosure proceedings were begun there could be
no doubt as to the result and concluded that the fact that the full sum had not been
deposited should not change the result.
61 262 Mich. 487, 247 N. W. 787 (1933).
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there was at the time in the sinking fund only about one-half of that
amount. The plaintiff, one of the holders of the maturing bonds,
sought a pro rata share of said funds, but the trustee denied his request
on the ground that the mortgage was in default and that this would
give a preference to one bond over another. The court, however, relying on the Equitable Trust Company case, pointed out that the preference was provided for by the trust instrument and that the bondholders
were entitled to their pro rata share.
The rights of bondholders in a sinking fund of a somewhat different nature were involved in Truby v. M. & T. Trust Co.,62 a
decision of the Supreme Court of New York for Erie County. In that
case the trust deed provided for deposits quarterly with the trustee of
an amount equal to five cents for each ton of sand or gravel shipped
from the mortgaged premises, and that the "sums so paid shall be
held by the trustee as a sinking fund and used by it from time to time,
and at least annually, for the payment and retirement of said bonds
pro tanto in the manner and upon the terms provided for the redemption of bonds" in the indenture. Unlike the cases that have been discussed above, the bonds were not of serial maturity, but the particular
bonds to be redeemed in a given year were to be determined by lot.
In compliance with the provisions of the indenture, the trustee made a
determination of bonds to be called, and notice was given the holders
that their bonds would be redeemed on April r, 1931. On that day
the mortgagor defaulted in an interest installment, and when the
plaintiff presented bonds which had been called for payment, the trustee
declined to redeem them on the ground that the moneys in the sinking
fund should be used to pay the defaulted interest upon the entire series
of bonds.
In an action against the trustee to determine the rights of the parties, it was held that the holders of .the bonds which had been called
were entitled to the funds on deposit. The court emphasized the fact
that the agreement provided that the funds were to be used for this
specific purpose, and that nothing in the trust indenture gave the
trustee the right to use the funds for the payment of interest on other
bonds.63 In answer to the contention that the result was inequitable,
141 Misc. 507, 253 N. Y. S. 108 (1931), noted 3 Fm. L. CHRON. 5 (1932).
"The bondholders all entered into the arrangement that for every ton of sand
or gravel sold 5 cents was to be deposited in the fund to be used for the redemption
of those particular bonds that fate destined to be drawn in the lottery. The agreement
provided that the funds were to be used for a specific purpose. There was no agreement
that if the interest was not paid upon the other bonds· the sinking fund could not be
62
63
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the court stated that the other bondholders "purchased the bonds with
full knowledge of the conditions of the mortgage and, therefore, they
are not in a position to complain of the better luck of those who were
fortunate enough to own the bonds that were drawn." 64
As the determination of the bonds to be called took place before
the default, it would seem that the right of the holders of the called
bonds to the funds on deposit became fixed at that time, and there is
no reason why the subsequent default of the mortgagor should divest
their rights. The determination in effect put the holders of the called
bonds in the same position they would have been in had the maturity date
been fixed in advance, and the principle of the Equitable Trust Conipany case is quite applicable.
If no determination of the bonds to be called has been made at
the time of the default of the mortgagor, it would obviously be unjust
to permit the trustee to use the funds for the redemption of bonds and
thus prefer some bondholders over others. The bondholders as a class
should be entitled to the funds. In First Union Trust & Savings Bank
v. Bernardin,65 a receiver sought to obtain the amount of a sinking fund,
which was to have been used for the purchase or redemption of outstanding bonds, to use in the payment of taxes on the mortgaged
premises, contending that as the fund could no longer be used to redeem
outstanding bonds the fund should be considered as part of the general
assets of the mortgagor. The court, in overruling his contention, pointed
out that "if the beneficiaries were not changed by substituting a certain
group of bonds prior to default as provided by the mortgage, the
original beneficiaries, i.e., the bondholders, as a class, remain as the sole
beneficiaries of the fund." 66
used to pay the interest. The trustee has no right to divert the funds because some one
may regret the bargain. Under the terms of the mortgage or deed of trust, the moneys
deposited ceased to be the property of the corporation and became a trust fund for
the benefit of the fortunate bondholders and no one else has a right to them." Ibid.,
141 Misc. at 510.
64
Ibid., 141 Misc. at 509-510.
65
(C. C. A. 8th, 1932) 60 F. (2d) 419, noted 32 MxcH. L. REv. 80 (1933).
66
Ibid., 60 F. (2d) at 423. Cf. In re Hotel Governor Clinton, (D. C. N. Y.
193 6) l 5 F. Supp. 519. In this case the court granted a motion that a fund in the
hands of a trustee which was to have been used for the purchase or redemption of
Series A bonds be applied to the ·payment of back taxes on the mortgaged premises.
The court felt that the fund was held as part of the collateral security behind the
bonds generally, and not for the benefit of any particular class of bonds. It appears,
however, that Series A bond_s had priority over the other bonds, and that practically all
of the holders of Series A bonds favored application of the fund to this purpose rather
than a pro rata distribution of the fund which would only have netted about 2 % to
each bondholder.
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II
RIGHTS ON THE INSOLVENCY OF THE DEPOSITORY

If it was the understanding of the parties that the funds deposited
were to be kept segregated and held in trust, either for the depositor or
the bondholders, and if the funds may still be traced in the hands of
the depository, the insolvency of the depository will give rise to no
real difficulty, for the funds will be safe from the general creditors of
the depository and neither the bondholders nor the depositor will suffer
any loss. But it is usually difficult to find that there was any understanding that the funds were to be kept segregated; and assuming that there
was such an understanding, it is very likely that the deposits have
either been dissipated or mingled with the other assets of the depository
so that no preferred claim may be established. Consequently, any rights
that either the depositor or the bondholders may have against the depository, while not to be disregarded, will as a practical matter generally prove to be of little value. Either the bondholders or the depositor will have to bear the loss, and litigation arising on the insolvency of the depository usually necessitates a determination of where
this loss will fall.
It is clear that the obligor may not discharge his obligation to the
bondholders by depositing funds in a bank or with the trustee even
though the bonds are payable at the bank or at the office of the trustee. 67
This is true even if the effect of the deposit is to confer upon the bondholders irrevocable rights, unless the bondholders have agreed that
the making of the deposit will discharge the personal liability of the
61
Adams v. Hackensack Improvement Co., 44 N. J. L. 638 (1882); First Nat.
Bank of Paterson v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., II5 N. J. Eq. 242, 170 A.
209 (1934), reversed on other grounds, II7 N. J. Eq. 508, 176 A. 582 (1935);
Williamsport Gas Co. v. Pinkerton, 95 Pa. 62 (1880); Mershon v. Millerstown
Borough, 128 Pa. Super. 248, 193 A. 328 (1937); Lusk State Bank v. Lusk, 48
Wyo. 547, 52 P. (2d) 413 (1935).
In Adams v. Hackensack Improvement Co., supra, bonds were payable at a bank
and prior to maturity the mortgagor deposited funds for this purpose, but the plaintiff
did not present his bonds for payment until after the suspension and insolvency of the
bank, which had occurred 1 1 days after the due date of the bonds. In holding that the
plaintiff might nevertheless recover, the court said: "The naming of a bank in a
promissory note as the place of payment, does not make the banking association an agent
for the collection of the note or the receipt of the money. No power, authority, or duty
is thereby conferred upon the banker in reference to the note; and the debtor cannot
make the banker the agent of the holder by simply depositing with him the funds to
pay it with." 44 N. J. L. at 646-647.
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depositor. 68 Where there is no provision in the bonds or trust deed
requiring the mortgagor to make deposits to pay principal or interest,
there is generally no basis for contending that the bondholders have
agreed to discharge the mortgagor from personal liability, for an actual
collateral agreement to this effect, though conceivable, would be rare.
The troublesome cases have been those where the deposits have been
made pursuant to a provision in the trust deed.
It is, of course, possible that the trust deed may spell out the rights
of the parties on the insolvency of the depository or contain provisions
that in some way clearly indicate what the intention of the parties is.
With respect to deposits in case of redemption before maturity or those
that are to operate by way of final defeasance of the trust indenture,
it has not been uncommon to provide in specific terms that the obligation of the depositor is to be discharged on the making of the deposit
and that the bondholders must look for payment only to the sums
deposited. 69 Generally, however, the provision in the trust deed will
merely set forth the mechanics of making the deposits.
The question whether deposits made pursuant to a provision requiring periodic deposit of a given percentage of the amount of principal and interest due at the next interest date will discharge the mortgagor, though payment to the bondholders is never effected due to the .
supervening insolvency of the depository, has been presented in a number of cases. In Silver 'V. Park-Lex Holding Corp.,7° a decision of the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, the trust deed
provided as follows:
"To secure the prompt payment of the bonds maturing in
each of the years 1927 to 1937, both inclusive, the Company
agrees to pay to G. L. Miller & Co., Inc., one-twelfth of the aggregate amount payable in each of said years above mentioned,
monthly in advance in cash . . . to be applied in the retirement
68 Andrews v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1932) 61 F. (2d)
452; Silver v. Park-Lex Holding Corp., 222 App. Div. 40, 225 N. Y. S. 394 (1927);
First Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Saxe, 211 Wis. 397, 247 N. W. 456 (1933). See also
3 Sc<>TT, TRUSTS,§ 531.1, p. 2540 (1939): "Ordinarily, it is clear, a debtor cannot
discharge his liability to his creditor by depositing funds in a bank with instructions
to par. the debt. The debtor continues to be liable for the debt until it is paid or unless
a novation is effected whereby the creditor accepts the liability of the bank in place of
the liability of the debtor. Where a corporation deposits money in a bank to meet
interest or principal due on its bonds, the question whether the corporation thereby
ceases to be liable and the bondholders can look solely to the bank depends upon the
terms of the trust indenture."
69 See note 5 2, supra.
10 222 App. Div. 40, 225 N. Y. S. 394 (1927).
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of the bonds maturing in that year ... and in order to accumulate
a fund sufficient to insure the prompt semi-annual payments of
interest on all of said bonds as they respectively mature, the Company agrees to pay G. L. Miller & Co., Inc., one-twelfth of the
amount of the interest which shall accumulate in each year on all
bonds at the time outstanding, monthly in advance in cash ...
to be applied semi-annually in the payment of the interest coupons
above mentioned."
·
Proper deposits had been made with Miller & Co., whose president
was trustee under the trust indenture, when the latter went into an
equity receivership. In a subsequent foreclosure suit, the mortgagor
contended that payments to Miller & Co. constituted payment of principal and interest to the bondholders, and that their obligations had
thus been discharged pro tanto. The court held, however, that the payments did not discharge the mortgagor pro tanto, but that "They were
merely additional security to the bondholders and cestuis under the
trust agreement." 11 The court stated that nothing in the bonds or
mortgage indicated that the bondholders were looking to the fund in
the hands of the depository except as security; that the mortgagor was
primarily liable for payment of the bonds and coupons; and that if it
had been the intention to release the mortgagor to the extent of the
deposits, "it would have been simple so to provide." 72 The fact that the
provision with respect to bonds called for redemption did so provide
was thought to confirm the conclusion that the mortgagor was not discharged by deposits to meet regularly maturing principal and interest
installments. The judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendant
was reversed, but a new trial was ordered because the provisions of a
certain paragraph of the trust deed were not before the court. The
defendants then appealed, but the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the order below without opinion. 78
71

Ibid., 222 App. Div. at 43.
Ibid., 222 App. Div. at 44.
78
248 N. Y. 537, 162 N. E. 515 (1928). An interesting case involving the same
problem as that under consideration, though not strictly within the scope of this paper,
is La Salle Hotel Realty Co. v. Taft, (C. C. A. 7th, 1936) 85 F. (2d) 339. In that
case an underwriting agreement provided for the purchase by the bank at a discount
of preferred stock to be issued by the defendant corporation and contained a. provision
requiring the corporation to deposit with the bank monthly "so much of its rental
receipts as constitutes one-twefth of the obligations for the ensuing year to its preferred stockholders, to be withdrawn solely for the purpose of meeting such obligations."
The preferred stock when issued contained a like provision. The bank then resold the
stock to its customers. Deposits sufficient to meet the stock maturing on June 1, 193 I,
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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 39

In Andrews v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co.74 the bonds and coupons
were payable at a bank in New York, but the trust deed provided for
deposits by the mortgagor with the trustee, a Tennessee bank, at least
thirty days prior to each semiannual interest date of a sum sufficient to
meet such interest payments. The trust deed then authorized the trustee
to collect all rents and profits and provided that "the trustee shall retain
one-twelfth of the annual sum due in each of the respective years . . .
for the purpose of meeting payment on principal and interest of the
bonds secured hereby.',. A sum sufficient to pay the coupons due on a
certain date had been retained by the trustee under the latter provision,
but the funds were not forwarded to the New York bank, as was the
customary practice, and a few days later the trustee failed.
In a subsequent suit against the mortgagor by an unpaid coupon
holder, the mortgagor contended that the trustee held the money as
agent of the bondholders and that its possession of it on the due date
of the interest coupons operated as a payment of the coupons. The court
held, however, that the coupon holders could recover from the mortgagor, pointing out that though the fund in the hands of the trustee
might be considered to be a deposit by the mortgagor, there was
"nothing in the language of either covenant to make the money thus
in the hands of the trustee at the maturity of the coupons to be ipso
facto payment" and that "The absence of such language is in strong
contrast with the explicit provisions to that effect when deposit is made
to pay called bonds." The fund was said to be "a security for the payment of the coupons about to mature." 75
were made by the corporation, but the bank became insolvent and preferred stockholders whose certificates matured on that date were unable to obtain payment. In an
action against the corporation, judgment was rendered in favor of the stockholders, and
this was affirmed on appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
The court said that "payment for stock which was the satisfaction of contractual obligations did not occur until the bank paid the money to the stockholder entitled to it''
and that "Until this satisfaction occurred the money in the bank did not pass to the
preferred stockholders." 85 F. (2d) at 341.
u (C. C. A. 5th, 1932) 61 F. (2d) 452.
75 Ibid., at 454. In the Andrews case the funds involved were rental moneys
collected monthly by the trustee from mortgaged property, and the trustee after making
certain required payments was to retain one-twelfth of the sums due in each year for
principal and interest payments. In Schwartzburg v. Rahtjen, 227 Wis. 525, 279 N. W.
19 ( I 9 3 8), the trust deed authorized the trustee to take possession of and manage the
mortgaged property, and provided that rents and profits collected, by the trustee should
be applied to the payment of operating and maintenance expenses, taxes, insurance, and
other expenses, and out of the sum remaining to the payment of principal and interest
on bonds, "Provided, always, if the sum so received by the trustee shall not be sufficient
to pay all of the above-mentioned payments when and as they become due, the first

1940]

DEPOSITS TO PAY DIVIDENDS

85

Ina Wisconsin case, First Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Saxe,1 6 it was held
that periodic deposits did not discharge the mortgagor, but emphasis
was placed on a phrase that did not appear in either of the above cases.
In the Saxe case funds which were to be used in paying bonds and
coupons due on a certain date had been deposited with the trustee, but
payments to the bond and coupon holders were not made and shortly
thereafter the trustee was adjudicated a bankrupt. These bondholders
claimed a right to be paid out of subsequent deposits with the successor
trustee, but the mortgagor, contending that the deposits constituted
payment pro tanto of the bonds and coupons to become due, instructed
the trustee not to pay their claims. The trustee then brought an action
for a declaratory judgment to have the court construe the trust deed.
parties [mortgagors] hereby covenant and agree to pay to the trustee a sum sufficient
to pay the same. • • ." The trustee went into possession of the mortgaged premises,
managed the same, collected the rents and profits and made various disbursements.
Though the receipts and disbursements indicated that the trustee should have had
sufficient funds, it failed to pay the bonds and coupons due on a certain date, and
shortly thereafter was adjudicated a bankrupt. Subsequently the mortgagor brought an
action for declaratory relief to establish that these bonds and coupons had been fully
paid and to discharge the lien thereof. The trial court granted the relief prayed for and
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the judgment. At the outset, the court
pointed out that the "arrangement was in the interest of the bondholders" and that
"To the investor in bonds it might well be considered as additional security." 227 Wis.
at 533. But in the next paragraph the court said: "The only obligation assumed by the
mortgagors was to pay 'if the sum so received by the trustee shall not be sufficient,' etc.
If the sum received was sufficient to make the payments, there was no further or
additional liability on the part of the mortgagors." 227 Wis. at 534. The court also
attached significance to the fact that the trustee was in possession of the premises, saying
that his rights, powers, and liabilities were those of a mortgagee in possession.
The construction placed on the clause in the trust deed requiring additional deposits if the sums received in rents and profits were not sufficient as relieving the
mortgagor from further liability if the funds received were sufficient seems utterly
unwarranted. Characterizing the trustee as a mortgagee in possession disregards the
obvious fact that the trustee acts for the mortgagor as well as for the bondholders, and
unrealistically stretches that concept. As the court admitted, the arrangement was undoubtedly additional security for the bondholders; it would have been more consistent
with this purpose to have construed the arrangement as not relieving the mortgagor from
personal liability to the bondholders. In substance the transaction differs little from that
in the Andrews case, but that case was not even cited in the opinion.
Prior to the decision in the Schwartzburg case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
had consistently protected the bondholders in the controversies arising on the insolvency of the trustee. See Connell v. Kaukauna, 164 Wis. 471, 159 N. W. 927, 160
N. W. 1035 (1917); First Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Saxe, 2II Wis. 397, 247 N. W.
456 _(1933); First Nat. Bank & T. Co. v. Vegel, 215 Wis. 359, 254 N. W.
537 (1934); In re Church's Will, 221 Wis. 472, 266 N. W. 210 (1936); Wasielewski v. Racke, 225 Wis. 245, 272 N. W. 846, 273 N. W. 819 (1937).
76 2II Wis. 397, 247 N. W. 456 (1933).
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The trust deed contained a covenant whereby the mortgagor agreed
to "pay to and deposit with the trustee" on the first day of each month
an amount equal to one-sixth of the total amount of principal and interest which was to become due and payable semiannually and then
provided that
"Moneys so paid or deposited with the trustee shall be held by it as
additional and collateral security under the provisions hereof for
the payment of principal and interest on the bonds at any time
issued and outstanding, and shall be paid and applied by the
trustee to the payment of the installments of interest and principal in the order of their maturity, until such funds are exhausted."
The trial court held that the deposits constituted payment pro
tanto of the bonds and coupons and discharged the mortgagor to the
extent thereof. Inasmuch as the trust deed stated that the deposits were
to be held as "additional and collateral security," the Wisconsin
Supreme Court could not see how they could be considered payment
of the bonds and coupons, but decided that the trustee in holding the
moneys deposited as additional and collateral security was the agent
of the mortgagor and the judgment was reversed. 77
It would seem that the fact that the periodic deposits are to be held
as "additional and collateral security" merely expresses what would
otherwise be implied. The purpose of requiring such deposits is to
make more certain the availability of funds for payment to the bondholders at the actual maturity date-they are merely an added protection for the bondholders. In essence the transaction is a security one,
and the deposits are in reality a sinking fund to secure payment. The
71 "Giving to that language its plain ordinary meaning, and in the absence of
language providing that the money deposited should be deemed a payment to the
trustee as agent of the bondholders, it must be held that the money so deposited was
additional collateral security, not a payment to the bondholders or their authorized agent.
Prior to June 1, 1931, the money deposited was not even available for payment to the
bondholders. So long as the money had to be held as collateral security, it is impossible
to see how it could be considered as a payment pro tanto of the bonds or coupons.
It seems fairly clear that the trustee, in holding the deposit as collateral security pending
the due date of the bonds, was acting as agent of the mortgagor." 21 I Wis. at 402.
The court had some difficulty wit1i a statement which it had made in Connell
v. Kaukauna, 164 Wis. 471 at 496, 159 N. W. 927 (1917), to the effect that a
"payment to the trustee merely as trustee cannot be held to be a payment to the bondholders, unless made when and as prescribed by the terms of the deed." (Italics supplied.) The court, however, said that the money in the instant case was deposited with
the trustee, not as payiµent, but as additional and collateral security until an installment of the bonds matured and could be paid.
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periodic deposits in connection with bonds of serial maturities accomplish essentially the same purpose as payments into a. fund which is
called a sinking fund and which is used to redeem bonds called by lot
or purchased in the open market. And clearly the loss of a sinking fund
will not extinguish the obligation of the maker of the bonds unless the
bondholders have agreed specifically to look only to the fund for payment.78 Where the provision in the trust deed merely sets forth the
mechanics of the making of the deposits, which may be treated as payments into a sinking fund, there is no basis, it would seem, for assuming
that the deposits are to discharge the mortgagor. If that is intended,
it would be a simple matter so to provide. The inference that no such
result is intended in the absence of specific language is especially strong
where the same trust indenture does so specifically provide with respect
to other deposits such as those for the purpose of redeeming called
bonds, as was true in two of the above cases.
That the deposits, which are made monthly for periods of from
six to twelve months in advance of the maturity date, are not intended
to be a payment pro tanto of the bonds and coupons seems obvious.
In determining who must bear the loss of such deposits, the important
question is not whether there has been payment of the bonds, but
whether the provisions of the trust deed can be said to be an arrangement on the part of the bondholders that the making of the deposits
will discharge the personal liability of the mortgagor. Nevertheless, the
defense in the cases that have been discussed seems to have been that the
deposits constituted payment pro tanto to the trustee as agent for the
bondholders, and there is considerable talk in the opinions about payment and whether the trustee in holding the deposits is the agent of
the mortgagor or the bondholders. Such talk merely throws confusion
about the real issues and serves as a convenient cloak to cover any result
that might be reached.
A number of courts have held that such periodic deposits are a
discharge pro tanto of the mortgagor's obligation, generally on the
theory that by making the deposits the mortgagor has paid its debt. The
78 "A sinking fund may be, and generally is, intended as a cumulative security
for the payment of the debt with which it is connected." Tennessee Bond Cases, 114
U. S. 663 at 698 (1885). See also Heider v. Hermann Sons Hall Assn., 186 Minn.
494 at 499, 243 N. W. 699 (1932): "It is very common for corporations to provide
a sinking fund to be used in retiring its [sic] bonds. But if unconditional bonds are issued
by it, the bondholder is entitled to payment of his bonds at maturity, irrespective of
whether or not there is money in the sinking fund for the payment thereof. The corporation may if it sees fit make its bonds payable only out of the sinking fund, by so
providing in the bonds."
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Kansas Supreme Court in McCormick v. Johnson 79 was, perhaps, the
first court to express this idea. In that case the mortgagor, who had
made deposits with a trustee that had become insolvent, sued to establish a preferred claim to the assets of the trustee in the hands of the
receiver, and to recover the money. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint, saying that the mortgagor had lost all interest
in the money, except perhaps the right to see that it was paid to the
beneficiaries, and that it would not su:ffer any loss. The mortgagor
seized on the suggestion that it might have a right to see that the beneficiaries were paid and appealed, contending that the lower court by
sustaining the demurrer had denied it this right. The judgment was
affirmed. The court thought it unnecessary to reproduce the provisions
of the "concatenated voluminosity called a trust deed," but stated that
the instrument "contained provisions for payment . . . to the trustee
of funds for principal and interest, and for distribution by the trustee
to bond and coupon holders of funds so paid." 80 The denial of recovery
to the mortgagor was affirmed on the ground that the mortgagor was
"not the donor of an express trust," but was "an ordinary debtor which
has paid its debt by deposit of money with a depositary who received
and held it for the account of the bonds and coupons, to the payment
of which the depositary was obligated to apply it." 81 In view of the
peculiar manner in which this case arose and the failure of the court
to set forth the pertinent provisions of the trust deed, the case is unsatisfactory as an authority; but it is clear from the opinion that the
court felt that the mortgagor was discharged to the extent of the
deposits made and that any loss would fall on the bondholders. 82
134 Kan. 153, 4 P. (2d) 421 (1931).
Ibid., 134 Kan. at 154, l 53·
81 Ibid., 134 Kan. at l 54.
82 In a subsequent Kansas case, Hall v. Goldsworthy, 136 Kan. 247, 14 P. (2d)
659 (1932), the mortgagor had deposited the sum of $1671.31 to be applied on bond
interest as it matured, but the trustee became insolvent and failed to apply the money
to this purpose. Shortly thereafter the mortgagor defaulted, and in an action by the
receiver of the trustee to foreclose the mortgage the mortgagor contended that the
bondholders should bear the loss with respect to this deposit with the trustee. The
court so held on the theory that "the plain intent of the parties was to vest the trustee
with the power to receive payment and to make distribution thereof." 136 Kan. at 253.
There is no indication in the opinion that there 'was a provision in the trust deed
requiring deposits with the trustee. The court merely pointed to provisions in the bonds
and trust deed making the bonds payable at the office of the trustee, that the trustee had
power on payment of the indebtedness to release the mortgage lien, etc., and stated
that as a result the trustee "is more than a depository." The court admitted that the
language in the trust deed in McCormick v. Johnson was "much stronger with reference
to payment than the language contained in the trust deed under consideration," but
79

80
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In Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Schmidt 83 the Kentucky
Court of Appeals was faced with the problem of deciding whether the
loss of periodic deposits should fall on the mortgagor or the bondholders in a case that would be of far reaching importance. The case
grew out of the insolvency of the Louisville Title Company, which
should have had on hand about $r,roo,ooo in monthly deposits, made
by numerous borrowers. These deposits were intended to be applied to
the payment of bonds and interest, but had been commingled with the
company's own funds and dissipated. The court, recognizing that the
problems presented were "difficult," "new," and "interesting and important," stated the facts "fully and with precision, in order to avoid
a contracted view of the case," 84 and carefully analyzed what it considered to be the substance and effect of the transactions involved.
In the Schmidt case a borrower, in order to obtain funds to finance
the construction of a residence, had made application to a mortgage
loan company for its "deed of trust and bond sales services." The loan
was approved, and bonds, secured by a mortgage deed of trust to the
loan company as trustee and guaranteed by the loan company, in the
aggregate sum of $5,700 were executed and delivered to the loan
company. In the bond the maker agreed to pay to the "Louisville Title
Company, Trustee, or bearer" principal and interest when due "at the
office of the Louisville Title Company." The bond recited that it was
secured by a mortgage deed of trust and that "The covenants of said
Mortgage deed of trust securing this Bond and its interest coupons are
made a part hereof as if herein written in full." The trust deed, which
was executed coincidentally with the execution of the bonds and which
was entitled "Sinking Fund Mortgage Deed of Trust," contained the
following two covenants:

"First: That he will pay the bonds and coupons hereby secured
according to the terms thereof at their respective maturities and
that in order to provide for the payment of same he will deposit
with the Trustee at least three days in advance of the time when
such coupons and bonds respectively mature, a sum of money in
gold coin or its equivalent as hereinbefore provided sufficient to
pay all of said maturing bonds and coupons.
decided that "there is a similarity in the two instruments and they attempt
the same end." 136 Kan. at 253.
83
245 Ky. 432, 53 S. W. (2d) 713 (1932), noted 42 YALE L. J. 756
84
Ibid., 245 Ky. at 433, 434. "The importance of the case lies in the
there are many others like it pending for determination by the receiver." Ibid.,
at 442.

to reach
(1933).
fact that
245 Ky.
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"Second: That in addition to the covenants last above written
and other covenants and undertakings in this instrument, and in
order to create a fund to be applied on the indebtedness secured
by this instrument and the interest on same, the Mortgagor will
deposit with the Trustee monthly before the close of business on
the even date of each month from this date until the maturity of
said indebtedness the sum of $52.27."
The ,mortgagor made the monthly payments as required by the
trust deed, and the first four bonds were canceled by the trustee and
returned to the mortgagor. The remaining bonds had been sold by
the trust company, and when they matured the trustee was insolvent
and in the hands of a receiver. The money deposited had been mingled
by the trustee with its private funds and was not available for payment
t◊· the bondholders. The mortgager desired to pay the balance due on
his bonds and a controversy arose as to the amount of money required
to discharge the debt. In a proceeding between the receiver of the
trustee, the mortgagor, and the bondholders, the trial court held that
the loss must be borne by the bondholders. The decision was affirmed
on appeal.
The court pointed out that the provisions of the trust deed had been
specifically incorporated into the bonds by reference, that the negotiability of the bonds had been destroyed by the character of this reference,
and that hence the covenants of the mortgage were binding on the
bondholders. It was then held that the "title company was the trustee,
agent, and representative of the bondholders to receive payment of the
debt in whole or in part," 85 and that the loss resulting from the default
of the trustee must fall upon the bondholders. 86
The court stated that the relationship between the borrower and the
title company ( the trustee) was that of debtor and creditor, and that
"the debt was to be paid to the title company in a particular manner,
regardless of the use made of the bonds." 87 The monthly payments, it
was said, were made a condition of the continuance of the loan, and the
title company did not surrender its control over the bonds or over
the collection and disbursement of the money even though the bonds
were sold. The title company was the "dominant authority throughout
Ibid., 245 Ky. at 448.
One justice dissented on the ground that "the monthly payments created a
sinking fund or security, and the unexercised authority conferred on the trustee on
which the opinion lays stress did not abrogate the status of such funds nor constitute
a payment on the bonds in any sense...." Richardson, J., 245 Ky; at 449.
87 Ibid., 245 Ky. at 445.
85
86
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the life of the bonds." 88 "It was either the bondholder or the representative of bondholders at all times, and all that it did, and everything that it was authorized to do, was on behalf of and for the benefit
of the bondholders." 80 It was then pointed out that the mortgagor had
performed the contract in accordance with the terms of his obligation,
and that the bondholders who had acquired their rights from the
trustee legally consented that the borrower discharge his contract in
the manner required by his mortgage.90
88

Ibid., 245 Ky. at 444.
Ibid., 245 Ky. at 448.
00
The case which goes to the farthest extreme in placing a loss occasioned by
the insolvency of a depository upon the bondholders is Benjamin Franklin Holding Co.
v. Clise, 174 Wash. 425, 24 P. (2d) 1065 (1933). In that case, the trust deed in
addition to requiring monthly deposits to pay principal and interest installments provided that the mortgagor would deposit with W. D. Comer & Co., the president of
which was trustee under the trust deed, on the first day of each month "an amount equal
to one-twelfth ( 1/ I 2) of the estimated annual charge for taxes, assessments, insurance
premiums, and all other expenses and charges to be paid by the Mortgagors under any
of the terms of this Indenture" and that the depository would pay these charges so far
as the said deposits were sufficient. Deposits which were to have been used in paying
general property taxes had been made by the mortgagor, but the depository became
insolvent and the taxes were not paid. The mortgagor then brought action to determine upon whom the liability for this loss should fall. The trial court held that the
depository received the money as agent for the bondholders, and that the latter must
sustain the loss. The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Washington.
The court pointed out that this plan of monthly payments in advance was for the
benefit of the mortgage creditors, and then said: "How, then, shall it be held that the
one to whom such payments are made is the agent of him who makes the payment?
Shall the one making the payment be considered as a principal and have the right
to withdraw from the one to whom the payment is made •.• the money intended by
the terms of the contract and the act of the parties to be for the benefit of him to whom
the payment is made? We think not." 174 Wash. at 430-431. It seems that the
deposits were intended as security only. The court, however, said, in distinguishing
Silver v. Park-Lex Holding Co., 222 App. Div. 40, 225 N. Y. S. 394 (1927), discussed supra at note 70, that the "payments in controversy here were in no sense
intended as security for the payment of the primary obligations secured by the mortgage." 174 Wash. at 432-433. True, they could not have been used to pay the bondholders if payment to them had not been made; yet the bondholders necessarily have
an interest in the discharge in due course of paramount liens such as taxes on the
mortgaged premises. The fact that the mortgagor could not withdraw the deposits
would, of course, be entirely consistent with their purpose to provide security for the
bondholders. But the court could only think in terms of agency. Because the mortgagor
could not withdraw the deposits, it followed that the depository did not hold the
deposits as agent of the depositor. Hence, the court thought, the depository must be
the agent of the bondholders, and the principal must stand the loss caused by his agent
-deceptive reasoning, but fallacious.
Much emphasis was placed in the opinion upon the fact that W. D. Comer &
Co., the depository, was the original purchaser of the bonds. If the depository had still
89
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In Masonic Widows' & Orphans Home v. Title Ins. & T. Co. 01
the Kentucky court was presented with additional questions as to the
rights of the mortgagor and the bondholders in a case which grew out
of the insolvency of the same trust company. The bonds and trust deed
in this case were almost identical with those in the Schmidt case, and the
court reaffirmed the position taken in that case.
A question not presented in the former case grew out of the fact
that the mortgagor had made eighty-five payments prior to the insolvency of the trustee though only sixty-eight payments would in fact
have been required. It was held that the loss of these anticipatory payments must fall on the mortgagor, as by the terms of the trust deed the
trustee was only entitled to collect the regular monthly deposits as the
agent of the bondholders. The trust deed did, however, contain a provision obligating the mortgagor to provide for payment of the indebtedness by depositing a sufficient sum at least three days in advance, but
this, the court said, "only contemplated a mode of payment diferent from the monthly payment plan in the event the latter plan
failed to produce the required amounts at least three days before the
maturities." g 2
In addition, a controversy between the bondholders was presented.
Holders of bonds with the latest maturity dates contended that the
loss should fall on the bonds next maturing after the failure of the
trustee, whereas the holders of the latter bonds contended that the loss
should be pro-rated among all of the bonds regardless of their maturity.
If the mortgagor had become insolvent instead of the trustee, under
held the bonds, obviously, it would have had to "bear the loss." But it was contemplated• that the bonds would be resold; and it is impossible to believe that it was intended that the deposits to pay taxes, etc., were in any way to affect the rights of
the subsequent purchasers to payment in full at maturity, which is in effect what the
court must have held in placing the "loss on the bondholders," for obviously the terms
of the trust deed could hardly be said to impose an affirmative liability on subsequent
purchasers of the bonds to pay the taxes if the depository failed to do so.
Because the trust deed specifically provided that the deposits to pay maturing
principal and interest installments were to discharge the mortgagor as against the
rights and claims of the bondholders, it was contended that inasmuch as the provisions
for monthly deposits for taxes did not provide to the same effect, it was not intended
to relieve the mortgagor from liability for the moneys so paid. The unresponsive answer
of the court, however, was that the provision for advance payments of taxes "was meant
for the safety and benefit of the bondholders, having in it no element of agency for
the mortgagors." 174 Wash. at 432.
91 248 Ky. 787, 59 S. W. (2d) 987 (1933).
92 lbid., 248 Ky. at 795. Justice Rees, who wrote the opinion, did not concur
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the decision in Equitable Trust Co. v. Green Star S. S. Corp.98 and
other cases that have been discussed, the holders of the bonds with the
earliest maturity dates would have been entitled to the funds on
deposit. It would seem to follow, assuming that the loss must fall on
the bondholders, that the holders of these bonds should bear the loss.
Moreover, the court in the Schmidt case indicated that the deposits
constituted payment pro tanto of the bonds. If the deposits did constitute payment, they could only be construed as being payment of the
bonds which were to directly benefit from the deposits, and these
would be the bonds with the earliest maturity dates. But the court in
the instant case quoted only the portions of the Schmidt case that indicated that the borrower having performed the contract in accordance
with the terms of his obligation should be discharged, and held that the
loss should fall equally on all outstanding bonds irrespective of their
maturities.
"Certainly there is no principle of equity," it was said, "which
requires the holders of obligations of equal rank in their right of
resort to the mortgage security, but of differing maturities, with
regard to their payment by the debtor, to be so unequally treated
merely because the trustee of the security and the collector of part
payments on the debt becomes insolvent and loses a part of the
payments theretofore collected by it." 94
The court then referred to the rule that the holders of bonds of
different maturities secured by the same mortgage were required to
share rata.bly in the proceeds of the mortgage security where there was
a deficiency, and indicated that "by a parity of reasoning the pro rata
rule should apply in allocating this loss." 95
The writer has suggested above that ordinarily the monthly deposits are merely additional security for the benefit of the bondholders,
and should not be construed as being a discharge of the mortgagor.
But the mortgage loan company type of transaction presented in the
Kentucky cases appears to be unlike that involved in the issuance of
industrial
bonds. The loan company, though trustee under the bond
.
'

in the conclusion that the loss of the pre-payments should fall on the borrower on the
ground that under the ruling in the Schmidt case the loss should fall on the bondholders.
98 (D. C. N. Y. 1922) 291 F. 650, affd. (C. C. A. 2d, 1924) 297 F. 1008, discussed supra, beginning at note 57.
94 Masonic Widows' & Orphans' Home v. Title Ins. & T. Co., 248 Ky. 787 at
796, 59 S. W. (2d) 987 (1933), quoting the lower court's opinion.
95 lbid.

94
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issue, was not a mere intermediary, but was, so far as the borrower
was concerned, the real creditor. The borrower had no interest in
floating a bond issue; that was a mere device by which the loan
company, if successful in selling the bonds, could raise additional
funds. What the borrower contracted for primarily was a loan. The
deposits, instead of being merely additional protection for the bondholders placed in the hands of a disinterested intermediary, appear
to be a repayment of th~t loan to the lender. In view of these circumstances the proper inference to be drawn may well be that the deposits
are intended to be in discharge of the personal liability of the borrower.
And as the provisions of the trust deed were incorporated by reference
into the bonds, which were held to be non-negotiable, there is no great
difficulty in holding that the rights of the bondholders may be limited
by the provisions of the trust deed. 06
The cases discussed thus far have involved periodic deposits with
the trustee of a certain percentage of maturing principal and interest
installments. There remains to be considered the rights of the parties
where the trust deed merely requires the mortgagor to deposit before
maturity funds necessary to pay maturing bonds and coupons.
In Morley v. University of Detroit 91 bonds of an issue aggregating
$2,400,000 were secured by a single trust mortgage to the Fidelity
Trust Company as trustee. The bonds, which were payable at the
office of the trustee, contained a reference to the trust mortgage
"for the amount of bonds which may be outstanding, a description of
the property thereby mortgaged, the nature and extent of the security
thereby created, and the rights of the holders of said bonds with respect
to such security."
The trust deed provided that the mortgagors will "promptly and
punctually pay the principal and interest of every bond .•• and will
deposit the necessary funds for such purpose with the trustee at least
five days prior to the respective due dates." Deposits sufficient to meet
principal and interest payments due on ~ given date had been made
by the mortgagor with the trustee. Not all of the coupons and bonds
96

See CAMPBELL, CASES ON BILLS AND NoTES 107, note l (1928): "If the
instrument provides that the mortgage (or other document creating the security right)
is a part thereof as if written therein, or uses equivalent words of incorporation, the law
must give effect to the provision." Citing Babbitt v. Read, (C. C. A. 2d, 1916) 236
F. 42 at 44.
97
263 Mich. 126, 248 N. W. 570 (1933), noted 32 MICH. L. REV. 232 (1933)
(appeal from order denying plaintiff summary judgment on the pleadings); 269 Mich.
216, 256 N. W. 861 (1934), noted 33 MicH. L. REv. 432 (1935) (appeal on
merits).
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were presented for payment on that date, and shortly thereafter the
trustee became insolvent and receivers were appointed. The plaintiff,
who had failed to present his bonds and coupons, sought to enforce
payment from the mortgagor.
The case was first presented to the Supreme Court of Michigan on
appeal from an order denying the plaintiff summary judgment on the
pleadings. The order was affirmed. The court pointed out that the fact
that the plaintiff had delayed presentment did not defeat his right of
recovery, for pr:esentment of a negotiable instrument is not necessary
to charge the party primarily liable. It was said that the "decision must
rest on the question of agency. Whose agent was the Fidelity Trust
Company? If it was the plaintiff's agent in collecting payments, there
can be no recovery." 98 The fact that the bonds were trust mortgage
bonds payable through the agency of a trustee was emphasized, and it
was said that "It is generally known by those who invest in this class ·
of securities that it is the duty of a trustee to receive payments from
the mortgagor and distribute them among the bondholders." 99 The
terms of the trust deed, though not expressly made a part of the bonds,
were to be considered as embodied therein and binding on the bondholders because the provisions of the trust deed were referred to in
the bonds. The reasoning of the court from that point is best illustrated
by the following excerpt from the opinion:
"These provisions of the trust mortgage and the terms of the
bonds together constitute the holder's contract with the mortgagor
and the trustee and show the conditions which the plaintiff accepted
when he purchased them. They show authority of the trustee to
receive payments and distribute them among the bondholders.
The mortgagor made its deposit with the trustee for the payment
of principal and interest, as required by the bonds and mortgage.
It did all it was required to do. It paid as it had agreed with the
bondholders. If it had not done so it would have been in default.
Once paid, it could not reclaim the money. Its title and control
passed to the Fidelity Trust Company, which thereafter held it as
trustee for the bondholders awaiting maturity of the bonds and
their presentment for payment. The money belonged to them. The
Fidelity Trust Company was their agent and trustee to receive it
and apply it in payment of their bonds and interest coupons." 100
Subsequently the case was tried on the merits and the plaintiff
Ibid., 263 Mich. at 128.
Ibid., 263 Mich. at 128.
100 Ibid., 263 Mich. at 129.
98

99
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again appealed from a judgment discharging the defendant from liability. The Supreme Court of Michigan, "on account of the importance
of the questions involved," 101 thoroughly reconsidered the case but
came to the same conclusion.102 On this appeal attention was called to
the fact that the trust deed in case of redemption of the bonds at the
option of the mortgagor before maturity provided that the deposits
with the trustee "shall be deemed a full payment of such bond and the
coupons belonging thereto . . . and the mortgagor shall in no event be
liable upon such bonds or coupons after deposit has been made as
herein provided." This was, of course, in sharp contrast with the provision for ordinary deposits, which in no way indicated what the legal
effect of the deposit should be. But the court held that the
"failure ... to use equally effective language as to paym~nt of
bond and coupons, as they mature, does not vitiate the effect of the
provision of the indenture obligating the mortgagor to deposit
funds with the trustee at least five days prior to the respective due
dates for the purpose of paying such maturing bonds and
coupons." 108
The court examined in detail the provisions of the trust deed. It
was pointed out that the insurance policies on buildings were payable
to the trustee; that the trustee gives notice of default; that it was
under a duty to make every endeavor to secure payment if the deposits
were not made; that on default sole right of action is vested in the
trustee and it could recover judgment against the mortgagor; and that
the mortgagor could not refuse to make the payments prior to due
date and could not withdraw them once made. The court concluded
that the "indenture shows beyond any question that the duties of the
Ibid., 269 Mich. at 217.
Though the decision on the first appeal was unanimous, on this ·appeal Justice
Potter dissented. He thought that the language of the first opinion went too far in
assigning reasons why the case should not be disposed of upon motion for summary
judgment and that the language should be eliminated or overruled.
103 Ibid., 269 Mich. at 219. In stating that the failure to use equally effective
language did not vitiate the effect of the provision, the court merely assumed the question in issue. Justice Potter, dissenting, said: "A similar provision might have been
made in relation to the payment of the bonds and coupons in question as they matured.
Not having been made, we think it a fair construction of the trust mortgage it was not
intended to be made.••." Ibid., at 239. And this is the inference that has generally
been drawn. See Andrews v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1932) 61 F.
(2d) 452 at 454; Silver v. Park-Lex Holding Co., 222 App. Div. 40 at 44, 225
N. Y. S. 394 (1927); but see Benjamin Franklin Holding Co. v. Clise, 174 Wash. 425
at 431, 24 P. (2d) 1065 (1933).
101

102
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trustee are for the benefit of the bondholders and adverse to the mortgagor." 104 It was clear then, the court indicated, that the mortgagor was
not making the deposits to its own agent for its own benefit. Pointing
out that the bonds were payable at the office of the trustee and reiterating the view expressed in the first opinion that investors in this class
of securities know that it is the duty of the trustee to collect payments,
the court asserted that "the trustee was the agent of the bondholders to
collect payments for them." 105
While it is hardly possible that deposits made periodically from six
to twelve months before maturity are received in payment by the trustee
as agent for the bondholders, where, as in the Morley case, the deposits
are made only a few days prior to maturity, such a contention is more
plausible. Much of the discussion in both opinions in the Morley case
centers about the question of payment. In the second opinion the court
said that the deposits "were made for the very purpose of payment,
and constituted payment" and that the trust indenture "unquestionably
constituted" the trustee the bondholders' agent to receive payment.100
Agency to receive payment must, however, be affirmatively established, either expressly or by implication by the party asserting the
benefit thereof. 101 In the case of negotiable bonds, it has been said that
where payment is made to one not in possession of the bond, the burden
is upon the party making the payment to show by clear and satisfactory
evidence that the person to whom payment is made is authorized to
receive it.108 The mere fact that the bonds or interest coupons or both
are payable at the office of the trustee will not constitute the trustee the
agent of the bondholders to receive payment,109 and it is difficult to see
how a provision in the trust deed requiring deposits with the trustee for
this purpose, which was the only additional circumstance of importance
104

Morley v. University of Detroit, 269 Mich. 216 at 222, 256 N. W. 861

(1934).
105

Ibid., 269 Mich. at 224.
Ibid., 269 Mich. at 220.
107
2 JoNES, BoNDS AND BoND SEcURITIEs, 4th ed.,§ 1043 (1935).
108
See Connell v. Kaukauna, 164 Wis. 471 at 496, 159 N. W. 927, 160 N. W.
1035 (1917).
1 01> "The fact that the bonds and interest coupons were made payable at the
office of the Trust Company did not make the Trust Company the agent of the bondholders to receive payment. Money deposited with the Trust Company for that reason
remained the property of the payor, and if lost it was the loss of the payor. . . . The
authority of the trustee to act for the bondholders is prescribed and limited by the
terms of the trust deed, and a payment to the trustee merely as trustee cannot be held
to be payment to the bondholders...•" Connell v. Kaukauna, 164 Wis. 471 at 496,
159 N. W. 927, 160 N. W. 1035 (1917). See also cases cited note 67, supra.
106

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 39

in the Morley case, does affirmatively show that the trustee has authority to receive payment. If this in fact had been intended, the trust deed
would undoubtedly have provided, as was done with respect to deposits in case of redemption prior to maturity, that the deposit "shall be
deemed a full payment of such bond."
In both opinions the court emphasized the fact that it is generally
known by investors in this class of securities that it is the duty of the
trustee to receive "payments" and make distribution among the bondholders. In using the word payment the court begged the question in
issue. Investors may know that it is the duty of the trustee to receive
deposits, but this does not appear to be relevant on the issue of whether
or not such deposits are received in payment. Nor is the fact that the
"indenture shows beyond any question that the duties of the trustee are
for the benefit of the bondholders and adverse to the mortgagor" of
any particular significance. If anything, the inference to be drawn
would be that no agency to receive payment is established, for such an
agency would be of no additional benefit to the bondholders and might,
if the trustee becomes insolvent, result in the loss of their entire investment.
The "agency to receive payment" approach, however, seems rather
unrealistic even when applied to deposits shortly before maturity. If
the trustee in the Morley case had become insolvent during the three
day period before the actual maturity of the bonds, it seems quite clear
that the court would nevertheless have placed the loss upon the bondholders, but it could hardly be said that the bonds had been "paid" by
reason of deposits made prior to maturity when the bondholders would
not be entitled to the deposits until maturity.
To discharge the mortgagor it is not necessary to hold, as the
court seemed to think, that the bonds have been paid. If by virtue of
the provisions of the trust deed it could be said that the bondholders had
agreed to look only to their rights in the funds deposited or to their
rights against the trustee personally, if any, that would be sufficient,110
assuming that the provisions of the trust deed are binding upon the
bondholders.111 This approach would require the court to go to the
110 At one place in the opinion the court did in the Morley case say that "The
moners so deposited were impressed with a trust of which the bondholders were the
beneficiaries." 269 Mich. at 222-223. To a certain extent this seems inconsistent with
the position taken in the case that the deposits were payment to the trustee as agent of
the bondholders, and may indicate that all the court really had in mind was that
the bondholders had agreed to look only to their rights in the funds deposited with the
trustee.
111 On the question whether a provision in the trust deed discharging the mort-
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root of the matter-to really analyze the transaction involved instead
of playing with concepts which merely becloud the basic inquiries. But
some courts have insisted that the sole question involved is one of
agency-to determine whether the trustee holds the money as agent
for the mortgagor or as agent for the bondholders. 112 With this as a
premise, it is almost certain that the loss will be placed on the bondholders. Obviously the deposits are for the benefit of the bondholders
and may not be reclaimed or controlled by the mortgagor. Therefore
the trustee does not hold the deposits as agent of the mortgagor; hence
he must be agent for the bondholders and they must bear the loss
occasioned by the insolvency of their agent. That, in effect, is the way
the argument in the Morley case proceeded.m
It will be recalled that the periodic deposits were found upon analysis to be in reality a sinking fund to secure payment of the bonds. While
the security nature of the transaction is not as apparent where the entire
sum due at a given time is deposited with the trustee a few days in
advance of maturity, even the court in the Morley case recognized this
in saying: "This provision is for the security of the bondholders for it
enables the trustee who is guarding their interests to have the required
moneys on hand for the payment of the bonds and coupons as they
become due and to take prompt action in case such moneys are not
paid." m In the absence of language compelling a different result, the
conclusion seems inescapable that a provision for such deposits in connection with a typical bond issue m should not be construed in a fashion
that may seriously impair the right of the bondholders to payment
when such provision is admittedly for the purpose of making such payment more secure.
gagor from further liability on the making of deposits with the trustee will be binding
upon the bondholders, see note I I 6, infra.
112
Cf. the following: "There is but one question, to wit: Whose agent was the
trustee at the time the money was paid to it by appellant?" Commercial Credit Co.
v. Seymour Nat. Bank, 105 Ind. App. 524 at 526, 15 N. E. (2d) 118 (1938), discussed note II5, infra. " ••• [The] decision must rest on the question of agency••••
If it [ the trustee] was plaintiff's agent in collecting payments, there can be no recovery." Morley v. University of Detroit, 263 Mich. 126 at 128, 248 N. W. 570 (1933).
113
Cf. Benjamin Franklin Holding Co. v. Clise, 174 Wash. 425, 24 P. (2d)
1065 (1933), discussed in note 90, supra.
.
lH Morley v. University of Detroit, 269 Mich. 216 at 222, 256 N. W. 861
(1934).
115
A recent Indiana case, Commercial Credit Co. v. Seymour Nat. Bank, 105
Ind. App. 524, 15 N. E. (2d) I 18 (1938), should be compared with the Morley case.
The same result was reached in this case, which involved notes secured by a trust deed
instead of bonds, as was reached in the Morley case, but the case deserves special

IOO

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 39

If any moral may be gathered from the cases that have been discussed, it is simply that trust deeds, long and complicated as they may
already be, have been inadequate in an important respect and should
specifically spell out the rights of the parties on the insolvency of the
trustee or other depository. But even if the trust deed specifically provides that the mortgagor is to be discharged upon the making of the
deposits, unless the provisions of the trust deed are incorporated into
the bonds or referred to for a statement of the terms and conditions
attention in view of the possible distinguishing circumstances surrounding the transaction. In the Commercial Credit Co. case the borrower to procure working capital
executed a trust agreement transferring certain contracts and notes to a trust company
as trustee, which for a consideration guaranteed payment of an issue of $60,000 in
notes secured by the trust deed. The notes when issued were turned over to a securities
company, an afliliate of the trust company, which then resold them to various purchasers. The notes, which merely recited that they were secured by a trust deed and
that the holders were "entitled to all the benefits accruing to said note hol4ers under the
terms of said indenture," were payable at the office of the trustee and bore maturities
of from one to six months. In the trust deed the borrower covenanted to deposit with
the trustee $10,000 on or before the 21st day of April, 1930, the first maturity date,
and a like sum on or before the same day of each calendar month thereafter for a period
of five months. The exact language of the provision requiring the deposits is not set
forth in the opinion, but the trust deed did provide that the "said amount so paid to
the trustee by the company shall be applied by the trustee on the payment of the notes
secured hereby in the order of their maturity."
The borrower made all the deposits required by the trust deed, but 36 days
after the final maturity date the trustee became insolvent and at that time the plaintiff
had not as yet presented his note for payment. In an action against the maker on the
note, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff in the trial court, but the Appellate
Court of Indiana reversed with instructions to enter judgment for the defendant. The
court pointed out that this was not merely a case of depositing money in a bank to pay
a note, but that the deposits were made with a trustee under a specific trust agreement; that the provisions of the note together with the trust agreement constituted the
holders' contract with the maker; that the contract specifically gave authority to the
trustee to receive payment for the note holders (by this the court apparently meant
that there was specific authority for the making of the deposits}; that when the deposits
were made, the borrower was discharged and the money was then held by the trustee
in trust for the holders of the notes. Emphasis was placed, as in the Morley case, on
the fact that the holder knew or should have known that it was customary for the
trustee to receive such payments for the holders of the notes.
The transaction between the borrower and the trustee in the instant case had
many of the characteristics of the type of transaction in the mortgage-loan bond issue
cases, which have already been discussed. The real creditor here, so far as the borrower
was concerned, was probably the trust company, which guaranteed the loan granted
through an afliliate. As has already been indicated (see supra, pp. 93-94), there may be
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upon which the bonds are issued, as distinguished from a mere reference
to the trust deed for security matters, it is at least questionable whether
the provisions in question will be binding upon the bondholders. m
Assuming that the provisions of the trust deed will bind the bondholders, where the trust deed merely requires the deposits to be made
without in any way indicating the effect thereof, the writer has attempted to show that consideration of the purpose of provisions requiring such deposits will generally clearly indicate that the proper
inference is that the mortgagor is not to be discharged from further
liability on the making of the deposits. Moreover, considerations of
equity and fairness warrant the conclusion that the ambiguity arising
from the fact that the mortgagor, who, unlike the bondholders, is a
party to the trust indenture and presumably has the benefit of experienced legal counsel, has failed to insert provisions protecting himself
should be resolved in favor of the bondholders.
more reason, viewing the transaction in its proper light, to hold that such deposits are
intended to discharge the borrower.
wi The problem which the statement in the text suggests is one that should not
be disregarded in any controversy arising between the mortgagor and the bondholders,
but it will be possible here to indicate but a few of its many ramifications.
As has already been indicated, if the provisions of the trust deed are incorporated into the bonds, or if the bond contains language which has that effect, the
provisions of the trust deed are unquestionably binding upon the bondholders, though
even in this case the result may seem a bit harsh on the bondholders, few of whom,
if any, ever see the trust deed. See note 96 supra. Incorporation of the extrinsic instrument· has, however, generally been held to be fatal to negotiability. King Cattle Co.
v. Joseph, 158 Minn. 481, 198 N. W. 798, 199 N. W. 437 (1924); see 42 HARv.
L. REv. II5 (1928). As a result, bonds generally merely refer to the indenture as a
means of ascertaining the nature and extent of the security and the rights of the holder
with respect thereto. In the case of instruments not incorporating the document of
security, there has been considerable confusion as to the effect of the provisions of the
trust deed on the rights of the bondholders. At least three general views have been
taken. See CAMPBELL, CASES ON BILLS AND NoTES II8, note 3 (1928). (1) That
since the note (or bond) and mortgage are parts of one transaction, pertinent terms
of the latter are imported into the former, often upon the theory that they constitute
one instrument. (2) That while the "note" and mortgage are parts of one transaction
and therefore each must be interpreted in the light of the other, they are separate
instruments, so that the terms of the mortgage may affect the rights arising upon the
note, either by way of enlargement or restriction. (3) That the note and mortgage are
separate instruments, and that the provisions in the mortgage, however explicit, cannot
legally effect the rights on the note. Under the first two views, a provision in the
trust deed discharging the mortgagor from further liability on the making of the deposits would effectively bind the bondholders. Not so, however, under the third view.

